Political instability in Pakistan: can a democratic federal political system resolve the problem of premature dissolutions of government in Pakistan? by Nawaz, A
  
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN PAKISTAN: CAN A DEMOCRATIC 
FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEM RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF 
PREMATURE DISSOLUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN 
PAKISTAN? 
 
 
Aamir Nawaz 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of 
Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctorate in Legal 
Practice 
December 2018 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blank Page 
 
Copyright © Statement  
This work is the intellectual property of the author. You may copy up to 5% of this 
work for private study, or personal, non-commercial research. Any re-use of the 
information contained within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the 
author, title, university, degree level and pagination. Queries or requests for any 
other use, or if a more substantial copy is required, should be directed to the author. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blank Page 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
This humble contribution I dedicate to the people of 
Pakistan – those who have sacrificed and endured a lot 
in their lives for a long time. The people of Pakistan 
deserve a stable country with a secure future for 
themselves and their children. 
 
 
And 
 
 
To my father for his firm faith in me that has always 
motivated me in my life 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blank Page 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................................ 1 
Table of Statute and Legal Instruments ......................................................... 2 
Table of Cases ............................................................................................... 2 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................... 3 
2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework ......................................... 8 
2.1 Ontology and Epistemology ...................................................................... 8 
2.2 The Position of the Researcher ................................................................. 9 
2.3 The Researcher as both insider and outsider ......................................... 10 
2.4 Methodologies and Methods ................................................................... 13 
2.5 Techniques used in the First Part of the Thesis ...................................... 14 
2.6 Techniques used in the Second Part of the Thesis (Comparative Law) .... 17 
2.6.1 The Skills of a Comparativist ........................................................... 20 
2.6.2 Evaluating External Law .................................................................. 22 
2.6.3 Evaluating Internal Law ................................................................... 22 
2.6.4 Determining Comparative Observations ........................................... 23 
3. Literature Review ............................................................................... 26 
3.1 Federalism ............................................................................................. 26 
3.2 Equal Representation ............................................................................. 29 
3.3 Doctrine of Separation of Powers ............................................................ 32 
3.4 Doctrine of State Necessity ..................................................................... 35 
3.5 State Structure ...................................................................................... 40 
4. Constitutional, Historical and Political Background ........................... 42 
4.1 Launch of Federalism in British India .................................................... 43 
4.2 History of Constitutional Instruments .................................................... 44 
4.3 Testing against the key factors of a Democratic Federal Political System 46 
4.3.1 The Pre-Constitution Phase (1935 – 1956) ....................................... 48 
4.3.2 The First Constitution (1956 – 1962) ............................................... 52
 4.3.3 The Second Constitution (1962 – 1973) ........................................... 56 
4.3.4 The Third Constitution (1973 – Present) ........................................... 58 
4.3.5 Summary of the Test Results ........................................................... 68 
5. A Comparative law inquiry into the USA and Pakistan Constitutional 
Systems ...................................................................................................... 73 
5.1 The State Structure Analysis .................................................................. 73 
5.1.1 The USA .......................................................................................... 73 
5.1.2 Pakistan .......................................................................................... 77 
5.2 Government Structure – Legislative & Executive .................................... 78 
5.2.1 The USA .......................................................................................... 81 
5.2.2 Pakistan .......................................................................................... 85 
5.3 Government Structure – The Judiciary ................................................... 88 
5.3.1 The USA .......................................................................................... 88 
5.3.2 Pakistan .......................................................................................... 93 
5.4 The key factors in the US context ........................................................... 96 
6. Conclusion ......................................................................................... 99 
6.1 Researcher’s Contribution to Knowledge & Practice ....................... 103 
6.1.1 Contribution to knowledge ......................................................... 103 
6.1.2 Contribution to practice .............................................................. 103 
6.2 Recommendations for policy and future research. .......................... 105 
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................ 108 
Bibliography .............................................................................................. 109 
Table of charts, tables and figures 
Table 1- Summary of Acts of Dissolution ............................................................ 69 
Table 2 - Summary of Results ............................................................................. 70 
Table 3 - Salient Features of the USA and Pakistan .......................................... 108 
  
1 
 
Abstract 
According to the researcher's hypothesis of constitutional suitability, only a suitable 
political system works efficiently, a suitable political system for a democratic federal 
state such as Pakistan is a Democratic Federal Political System, which comprises 
key factors such as equal representation, separation of powers and a system of 
checks and balances. These factors appear to be either missing or not appropriately 
incorporated in Pakistan's past and present constitutional instruments. To test the 
hypothesis, this document uses two methods of investigation.  
The first is a qualitative, interpretative evaluation of the prevalence of absolute 
power and self-interest in Pakistan's constitutional history by reference to historical 
and statutory sources. This can be traced back to colonial times. Absolute power 
has been carried forward either explicitly or implicitly in Pakistan’s constitutional 
instruments to preserve self-interest that followed on from vice regal reigns, which 
has resulted in seven episodes of state emergency. At times, some of the key factors 
have been present in Pakistan, putting a temporary halt to premature dissolutions 
of government. However, it is concluded that the practice is likely to continue until 
a suitable political system is assumed.  
The second is a structuralist and functionalist comparative law analysis of both the 
state and political structures of the USA and Pakistan. The USA's political system 
has great similarities to the researcher's model of a Democratic Federal Political 
System. This analysis shows that there appear to be several incompatibilities 
between the political systems. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of similarity 
between the state structures of both countries. It is, therefore, concluded that the 
initial hypothesis has been substantially borne out, and that it would be possible 
for Pakistan to adopt a Democratic Federal Political System, although slight 
variations from the US model will be required. 
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1. Introduction 
The central problem that this research project is designed to address is that 
Pakistan has gone through seven episodes of premature dissolutions of government 
since its inception in 1947 which, amongst other issues,1 have caused an 
environment of great political instability in the country. The term 'premature 
dissolution' in this thesis refers to dissolving the legislature and executive branches 
of federal and provincial governments - whether constitutionally or otherwise - 
before the expiry of their normal term.2 Key factors identified in the literature 
discussed in Chapter 3 which appear to contribute to premature dissolution, are:  
1) disparity of representation, which is enshrined in the design of the constitutions; 
2) self-interest, in creating legislation which allows or protects the acts of premature 
dissolution and the role of the judiciary in terms of interpretation and  
3) use of the doctrine of state necessity.  
These factors appear to be interconnected since situations in which state necessity 
is relied on are caused or invoked by the military, politicians and/or the judiciary 
in response to issues such as disparity of representation, self-interest and uneven 
distribution of power flow between legislature, judiciary and executive (that is, a 
failure in the system of checks and balances). 
In contrast, the USA, also a post-colonial, democratic federal state, has not 
experienced a similar history of premature dissolution or constitutional crisis. It 
has therefore, for reasons set out in Chapter 2, been selected as a suitable 
comparator. It is, however, important for that comparison that the role of 
Enlightenment philosophy in the development of the US constitution is understood, 
and this is discussed in Chapter 5. 
The aim of this thesis is, then, to examine as its primary hypothesis the idea that 
adoption of certain aspects of the US political system could resolve the problem of 
premature dissolutions of government in Pakistan: A Democratic Federal Political 
                                           
1 For example, nepotism in the form of political party ownership by certain families, corruption with 
limited accountability, military intervention in political affairs. 
2 The legislature can be dissolved constitutionally by invoking Article 58 (2) (B) of the Constitution or 
by unconstitutional means such as military takeovers. 
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System in the sense defined in this thesis, can resolve the problem of premature 
dissolutions of government in Pakistan. In order to formulate possible constitutional 
solutions for Pakistan’s problem, the researcher’s starting supposition involves a 
hypothesis that he has called constitutional suitability i.e., that a country should 
have an appropriate political system with respect to its state structure.3 For the 
purpose of this research an appropriate political system with respect to a federal 
state will be defined as a Democratic Federal Political System, with capitalisation to 
distinguish it from any other form of federalism. In this sense, it is proposed that a 
Democratic Federal Political System is one that encompasses the essential features 
of US democracy and federalism, such as equal representation, separation of 
powers, and systems of checks and balances. In this project, these features of the 
US system are referred as key factors, which are explored in more detail in Chapter 
3 in the light of the philosophical literature. 
In order to test the starting hypothesis, it is important to address its associated 
following sub-questions:  
1. Are premature dissolutions of government an on-going and important issue in 
Pakistan?  
2. Are the present and past political systems Democratic Federal ones? 
2.1. Does the political system address issues of equal representation? 
2.2. Does the political system provide for separation of powers and checks and 
balances? 
2.3. Are there elements of self-interest exercised by influential individuals that can 
override the controls in the system? 
3. Is there any connection between premature dissolutions of government and one 
party having an absolute majority? 
4. Is the state structure of Pakistan compatible with a Democratic Federal Political 
System?  
                                           
3 If a political system is not suitable for, or compatible with, the state structure, it gives rise to 
problems for example, in the case of Pakistan, premature dissolutions and secessions. 
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The structure of the professional doctorate requires the research investigation to be 
broken into two parts, each of which is submitted as a separate document and each 
of which has a different methodological emphasis.  In order to set the scene for the 
thesis, therefore, Chapter 2 sets out the methodological approaches used in 
answering the subsidiary research questions.   
After exploring relevant literature on the key factors in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 then 
begins with a discussion of the historical and constitutional history of Pakistan, 
both as background to the study as a whole and also as a problem statement which 
responds to sub-question 1.  This discussion not only justifies the need for research 
on this issue but also highlights the pattern of premature dissolutions of 
government. 
The second sub-question addressed in Chapter 4 then begins to set the scene for 
the comparative exploration in Chapter 5.  It does so by evaluating the situation in 
Pakistan, over the course of its history, by reference to the concept of the Democratic 
Federal Political System. The test here is comprised of a further three questions 
nested under the second sub-question. The first two questions will be answered in 
the affirmative and the last in the negative if the political system is constitutionally 
suitable as described above. The first two questions of this test are derived from the 
three key factors identified in 3.1 and 3.2 and are, as explained, in those sections, 
essentially drawn from the US model of democratic federalism. The third question, 
not obviously linked to the key factors of a federal system, is included because it is 
inter-linked with problems of absolute power that, it is argued, create the potential 
for reliance on the doctrine of state necessity, which has, as explained in Chapter 
4, caused grave obstructions in the functioning of democracy and federalism in 
Pakistan.  
For clarity, the analysis of Pakistan's constitutional history by reference to these 
key factors is divided into four periods, each of which will be tested against the three 
questions set out above as part of the second research question. As explained in 
Chapter 4, the current and inadequate response to such problems in Pakistan has 
been a reliance on the doctrine of state necessity. It is argued that the episodes of 
premature dissolution of government which have been a feature in Pakistan are 
directly related to the failure to adopt, in the country’s constitution, the key factors. 
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It is the researcher’s hypothesis, therefore, developed in the concluding Chapter 4 
that incidents in which the doctrine of necessity is invoked, and governments are 
overthrown, could be pre-empted if the key factors were in place.  
This part of the thesis involves applying the test to all legislatures including 
prematurely dissolved, completed term and martial law regimes. Martial law 
regimes' legislatures are very important, as will become apparent in Chapter 4, as 
these governments managed to attain their legitimacy through the judicature.4 The 
judiciary not only supported the imposing of martial law, but also the abrogation of 
constitutions,5 which otherwise is classed as high treason. By drawing on legal 
realism, exploration of the reasoning and the decisions of the judges is carried out 
in Chapter 4. These decisions revolve around the use of the shield of necessity to 
justify the dissolution of legislatures.  
The third sub-question addressed in Chapter 4 is designed to determine whether 
there is a causal link between a legislature for the first time completing its term and 
the coalition government that was in place in 2008-13. The hung nature of this 
parliament can be seen as a coincidental adoption of one of the significant key 
factors at least in its essence, i.e., checks and balances. The completion of the 
democratically elected parliamentary terms for the first time led to another 
successful parliamentary term in 2013-2018 and the graph appears to be changing 
course in a positive direction. It is not, however, an indication that the political 
system has somehow been improved, as there are no significant changes of the kind 
that this thesis is proposing. 
Having determined the extent to which, if at all, the situation in Pakistan satisfies 
the test, and how far, therefore, it represents a Democratic Federal Political System, 
the fourth sub-question is to determine the point of commonality between the state 
structure of Pakistan and USA, so that a thorough comparative analysis of both 
political systems can be carried out in the final stage of this thesis in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 3 then provides a literature review of key concepts that are used in the 
analysis in Chapter 4.  This provides the opportunity to understand these concepts 
fully before they are used in comparative analysis in Chapter 5. 
                                           
4 Muhammad Nasrullah Virk, 'Doctrine of Necessity-Application in Pakistan- Cases of 
Immense Importance- A Critical Review' (2012) 2(2) International J. Soc. Sci. & Education 82. 
5 ibid. 
7 
 
Having explored the history of Pakistan, including that country’s unique reliance 
on the doctrine of state necessity as a resolution to constitutional problems, 
Chapter 5 then pursues the question of using the US model to help resolve those 
problems further by conducting a structural and functional comparative analysis of 
the constitutional systems of these two countries. 
Following this comparative analysis, Chapter 6 provides a response to the overall 
hypothesis, that a Democratic Federal Political System would help address the 
problems of political instability identified in this chapter and in chapters 3 and 4, 
and that an initial template can be found in the US system discussed in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 also articulates the contribution to knowledge and to practice claimed in 
the thesis and provides recommendations for policy, practice and future research. 
The next chapter explains the overall methodology and methods employed in the 
two investigations that are combined in this thesis. 
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2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
2.1 Ontology and Epistemology  
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge as to what is known and how it comes to 
be known.6 Ontology is the nature of reality and its characteristics,7 it is 'the study 
of 'being' concerning with 'what is', with the nature of existence, with the structure 
of reality as such'.8 
The researcher starts from the ontological position that there is a problem of 
ongoing political instability in Pakistan in which a number of factors including, 
ultimately, reliance by the judiciary on the doctrine of state necessity, play a part 
and that the existence of this problem can be objectively determined. As a realist, 
however, the researcher is not only evaluating the legal system but is also describing 
how it works in practice.9 
Epistemology involves, in essence, a choice between positivist and interpretivist 
methods of data collection and analysis to provide results that generate a justified 
true belief in the answer to the research question. The researcher brings his practice 
experience as a litigation lawyer to the question of epistemology. He is, as a lawyer, 
conscious of the need to use credible, valid evidence to prove his conclusions. 
Epistemologies usually contain an understanding of the unit of appraisal in the 
sense of what is being judged. This, in litigation terms, means the application being 
made, the standards of judgment (in the sense of how valid judgments can be made; 
the standard of proof) the underpinning logic (in the sense of the form of reasoning 
that takes in understanding the real as rational) and the submissions and argument 
of the advocate.10  
The researcher's unit of appraisal in this project is the contribution to premature 
dissolution of government of the key factors set out in the research questions. The 
                                           
6 Jack Whitehead and Jean McNiff, Action research living theory (SAGE Publications 2006) 23. 
7 John W. Creswell, Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five approaches (3rd 
edn, SAGE 2013) 20. 
8 Michael Crotty, The foundations of social research: meaning and perspective in the research 
process (SAGE 1998) 10. 
9 Mark Van Hoecke, 'Legal Doctrine: Which method(s) for What kind of Discipline?' in Mark Van 
Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
2011) 3. 
10 ibid. 
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standards of judgment include the critical evaluation of these concepts and the logic 
is the way in which inferences are drawn from that critical evaluation.  
It is the researcher's position that, in order to demonstrate a justified true belief in 
his findings, he must adopt a blended epistemology in which he first uses a 
positivist approach in describing what the law is and has been, and the political 
and historical state of affairs that surrounds it in chapters 3 to 4.  In order to answer 
the research questions, however, it is necessary to go beyond positivism into a 
qualitative, interpretative analysis that allows him to explore from a realist 
perspective, for example, the causes of the particular problem under investigation, 
that is premature dissolutions of government. It also allows for the structural and 
functionalist comparative investigation that takes place in Chapter 5.  
2.2 The Position of the Researcher 
As indicated above, the researcher brings to the project his experience as a litigation 
lawyer. In terms of the credibility of the research and the validity of its conclusions, 
however, there is an important question about whether the researcher is adequately 
informed to do such an evaluation and apply the necessary standards of judgment.  
An overview of the researcher's own academic and professional standing may be 
useful to give some background to illuminate the starting point for this section. 
The researcher is qualified as a lawyer in several international jurisdictions. He had 
an opportunity to study the political systems of different countries. His areas of 
expertise are in English constitutional law, the constitutional law of Pakistan, India 
and the USA. As a political scientist the researcher also has a command of US and 
Indo-Pak history. 
The researcher has also been a lecturer in constitutional law (of Pakistan and USA) 
and has a first-hand knowledge of all the constitutional events since 1992 and is 
something from which he has derived his hypothesis. It is this evolved belief that a 
state should adopt a political system that is best suited to its state structure, which 
he regards as a hypothesis of constitutional suitability. The development of his 
hypothesis and the driver for this project, are linked to the researcher’s personal 
values and beliefs in fairness and justice.  That is, the project is strongly informed 
by his axiology.  
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Axiology is the philosophical study of theory of values.11 Modern axiology is a 
companion to epistemology and metaphysics12 and usually confines itself to 
problems such as common nature of values, status of values, scientific method of 
inquiry applicable to the value judgment and value proposition.13  
It is the researcher's hypothesis that the premature dissolution of governments in 
the history of Pakistan is directly linked to the consecutive adoption of several 
unsuitable political systems. To explore and analyse these assertions, the 
researcher has applied his axiology in exploring these legal concepts in the light of 
established jurisprudence and philosophy in Chapter 3. 
As is normally the case in a professional doctorate project, therefore, the 
researcher’s position as (to some extent) an insider to the topic becomes relevant. 
2.3 The Researcher as both insider and outsider 
The outsider concept describes researchers who research as impartial investigators 
and who are independent. Outsiders are valued for their objectivity, 'which permits 
the stranger to experience and treat even his close relationships as though from a 
bird’s-eye view'.14 
The insider principle, however, suggests that 'outsider researchers … never truly 
understand a culture or situation [as] they have not experienced it'.15 Insider 
researchers are therefore uniquely positioned to 'understand the practices of their 
community and perhaps the reasoning behind such practices'.16 Insider researchers 
are often able to 'engage research participants more easily and use their shared 
experiences to gather relevant information'.17 
The researcher is not a complete insider or a complete outsider:  he positions himself 
somewhere in the 'space between the insider/outsider dichotomy'.18 He has 
                                           
11 Samuel L. Hart, 'Axiology--Theory of Values' (1971) 32(1) Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 29 31. 
12 Richard Fulkerson, 'Axiology' in Theresa Enos (ed), Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: 
Communication from Ancient Times to the Information Age (Routledge 1996). 
13 Samuel L. Hart, 'Axiology--Theory of Values' (1971) 32(1) Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 29. 
14 Georg Simmel and Wolff Kurt, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (New York: The Free Press 1950) 405. 
15 Katie Kerstetter, 'Insider, outsider, or somewhere in between: the impact of researchers’ identities 
on the community-based research process' (2012) 27(2) Journal of Rural Social Sciences 99. 
16 ibid. 
17 Sonya Dwyer and Jennifer Buckle, 'The Space Between: On Being an Insider-Outsider in 
Qualitative Research' (2009) 8(1) International Journal of Qualitative Methods 54. 
18 ibid. 
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assumed a responsibility to understand and realise where he is positioned within 
this space and to explore how his status may affect the research process and its 
outcomes in this thesis.19 
The researcher is an insider to some of the issues being researched such as 
Pakistan's constitutional history, especially the events that occurred in his lifetime. 
This leads him to take a realist/interpretivist approach to his analysis in chapters 
4 and 5 that evaluates not just what the law is, but how it actually operates, and 
the influences, political or otherwise, that cause it to operate in that way. Where he 
conducts a comparative analysis in Chapter 5, he uses a model that explicitly 
requires him to consider the cultural context of the two systems being compared. 
However, he is testing a hypothesis drawn from his own insider/professional 
perspective and needs to remain open to ideas and evidence that might tend to 
weaken or disprove the hypothesis. The researcher is an outsider at the same time 
as he has knowledge and working understanding of other legal systems, for 
instance, the UK where he resides and has been practising law for years. 
The researcher realises that being an insider and outsider at the same time can 
raise issues of maintaining impartiality. The major concern of partiality is only 
associated with the researcher being an insider. To overcome his position as an 
insider he is determined to show 'familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect'.20 
Being an insider raises concerns of objectivity, reliability and validity.21 In the 
context of this thesis, these terms refer to impartiality, consistency and rationality. 
These concerns are based on a reasonable assumption that researchers run the risk 
of 'going native' i.e. over-identifying with the subject matter under observation, 
'getting too close or staying too long'.22 
'Going native' in the context of this thesis, refers to the researcher's adopting the 
same standpoints or perception of two contrasting groups i.e. those who founded or 
                                           
19 Laura Serrant-Green, 'Black on Black: Methodological Issues for Black Researchers Working in 
Minority Ethnic Communities' (2002) 9 Nurse Researcher 30. 
20 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1971) 91. 
21 Pat Sikes and Anthony Potts (ed), Researching Education from the Inside: Investigations from 
Within (Routledge 2008) 7. 
22 Michael Stein, 'Your place or mine: the geography of social science' in Dick Hobbs & Richard 
Wright (ed), The Sage Handbook of Fieldwork (Sage 2006) 72. 
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still support the existing political system of Pakistan, and over identifying with those 
who are in support of a presidential system for Pakistan. 
The researcher understands that being an insider and outsider are not only 
positions but also identities. For example, the researcher has been following the 
political events as they happened and have established his views based on what he 
perceived, however at the same time being located in the UK and practising law in 
England and Wales interprets these events differently than those who are located 
in Pakistan. Researchers are always 'insiders in some contexts and outsiders in 
other situations'.23 Insider research has its advantages and can be both scholarly 
and rigorous.24 The researcher maintains his objectivity in Stenhouse's sense, when 
he states: 
Whilst I acknowledge the need to take up the issue of objectivity in 
social research, it is not an issue I am well equipped to handle. Partly 
because I personally have been untroubled by the problem. 25 
The researcher regards himself as a realist evolving in the spaces and connections 
not only between his roles as insider and outsider but also between his several other 
identities as a lawyer and researcher. 
As stated earlier, it is the researcher’s hypothesis that the problems in Pakistan 
arise from fundamental failings in the design and operation of its constitution. He 
is sceptical about the way the judges approach the doctrine of state necessity. A 
common law system may be particularly prone to this issue simply because the 
judges are required to make decisions on the basis of already set precedents, and 
on the basis of imperfect facts and submissions, where human frailties can play out 
in practice.26 As an insider this is interpreted differently, educated in Pakistan, the 
researcher knows that these approaches by judges have always been criticised. 
However, as an outsider, the researcher takes a different view by plunging into the 
rationale behind these decisions explained in Chapter 4. 
                                           
23 Susan Matoba Adler, 'Multiple Layers of a Researcher's Identity: uncovering Asian American 
Voices' in Kagendo Mutua & Beth Blue Swadener (ed), Decolonizing Research in Cross-Cultural 
Contexts: Critical Personal Narratives (State University of New York Press 2004) 107. 
24 Pat Sikes and Anthony Potts (ed), Researching Education from the Inside: Investigations from 
Within (Routledge 2008) 7. 
25 Jean Rudduck and David Hopkins, Research as a Basis for Teaching: Readings from the Work of 
Lawrence Stenhouse (Heinemann 1985) 14. 
26 Joseph William Singer, 'Legal Realism Now' (1988) 76(2) California Law Review 465. 
13 
 
In the next section, the researcher explains the methodology and methods used in 
this project.  
2.4 Methodologies and Methods 
Methodologies used in this thesis are influenced by the researcher's epistemology 
in the light of Realism, Positivism, Instrumentalism and Interpretivism. This thesis 
comprises two parts, the first from chapters 3 to 4 that establishes the concepts 
(such as federalism, the key factors used for the purpose of analysis and the 
doctrine of state necessity) and tests the phases of Pakistan’s constitutional history 
against the key factors. The second, in Chapter 5, compares an established concept 
to another existing concept (i.e. the US presidential system). Since both the tasks 
are distinct, the researcher cannot achieve this without employing two different 
techniques to serve the purpose. 
As Hutchinson and Duncan point out, conventional legal analysis is positivist first 
and then interpretivist next, when one looks at the meanings and uses of the 
statutes, events and cases and at the way they are shaped by and interpreted by 
people, including the researcher. The research technique for the first part of the 
thesis, in Chapter 4, is taken from the doctrinal model. The researcher's position as 
a realist bridges the gap and explains why he cannot take the positivist information 
at face value.  
The initial positivist evidence is straightforward to locate – the statutes and the 
cases already exist and explored.  The researcher has used the test in Chapter 4 to 
keep the analysis consistent and coherent to help connect the first part of the 
analysis with the second part to ensure that the comparison is like with like.  The 
test embedded in the second sub-question is both positivist and interpretivist in 
nature. The researcher is relying on the argument that a Democratic Federal 
Political System or something similar (such as the political system of the USA) can 
correct the issues in Pakistan's political system. 
Some, for example Greenberg27 and Brink,28 argue that legal interpretivism is an 
amalgam of legal positivism and natural law theory. Dworkin also sees positivism 
                                           
27 Mark Greenberg, 'How Facts Make Law' (2004) 10 Legal Theory 157. 
28 David Brink, 'Legal Interpretation and Morality' in B Leiter (ed), Objectivity in Law and Morals 
(Cambridge University Press 2001). 
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and natural law theory as rules and as having a normative attribute.29 However, 
legal interpretivism emphasises that legal interpretation is tempered by legal 
tradition.30 The researcher's view is that factors and rules collectively form both 
what the law is and how it can be interpreted. Such an approach, according to 
Feldman, is known as the interpretive turn in jurisprudence.31 
As an experienced practitioner, the researcher is familiar with the conventional 
doctrinal approach used in legal analysis and, therefore, brings a practice 
perspective to the analysis. However, this thesis is not entirely dedicated to 
exploring statutes and case law, therefore the approach used in chapters 3 and 4 is 
analogous to the doctrinal method, rather than used in its entirety. 
However, the subsequent comparative law analysis needs variables which will come 
from the analysis in the first part of the thesis, these variables include federalism, 
separation of powers, checks and balances and necessity. The comparative law part 
of the thesis in Chapter 5 is therefore dependent upon the outcome of the first part 
of the thesis. 
2.5 Techniques used in the First Part of the Thesis 
This thesis analyses the problem of premature dissolution of government and 
proposes a solution which can address the recurrence of such episodes. The 
doctrinal approach is relied upon in order to examine the case law and legislation 
that support or have supported premature dissolution of government. As indicated 
above, doctrinal approach is not only about the concepts but also allows for 
problem-solving by incorporating both positivist and interpretivist approaches.32 
The test used in Chapter 4 incorporates these two main concepts alongside classic 
realism. Legal realism challenges the classical legal claim of law as being 'separate 
and autonomous from moral and political discourse'.33 It is not possible to just look 
                                           
29 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
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at the law in a positivist way without understanding the surrounding political 
context. 
Chapter 2, where Pakistan’s constitutional history is assessed by reference to the 
key factors, has divided the constitutional history into four periods, each of which 
involves legal systems already established by (political) authority, that is, 
constitutional law, in Hart's positivist sense.34 These implemented legal systems are 
then subject to an interpretivist interpretation so as to answer the research 
questions. 
The researcher is aware that challenging the existing political system can be of an 
interdisciplinary nature. Since the thesis employs two research techniques, the 
researcher admits that not only jurisprudential and philosophical approaches are 
central to the challenge but there may be some alignment of sociological and 
anthropological approaches too. Those two approaches are not explored in detail 
except where they are already incorporated in the chosen methods, for example, 
comparative law involves an anthropology element and legal realism involves an 
element of sociology.35 The researcher like authors in interdisciplinary approaches 
(such as Vick36 and Balkin37) use both philosophical and sociological standards to 
cover multiple disciplines.  
The researcher is aware of the possibility of inappropriate shifts in focus if he tries 
to involve himself in to too many disciplines. In Chapter 3, the researcher explores 
the relevant concepts (as indicated above) from philosophy and integrates them with 
the hypothesis of constitutional suitability and the concept of a Democratic Federal 
Political System as a result of his investigation into his initial hypothesis.38 To draw 
a boundary and maintain focus, he very briefly resorts to legal instrumentalism i.e. 
'the view that the law should be used as a tool to achieve social purposes and to 
balance competing societal interests'.39 As indicated in Chapter 1 and explored in 
much more detail in Chapter 4, state necessity is an important feature in Pakistan's 
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constitutional history and especially its judicial interpretation. Gardner discusses 
instrumentalism by reference to its extension to necessity.40 He believes that 'it may 
seem unacceptable even to contemplate the replacement of the norms of a 
democracy by the acceptance of refractory conduct as being justified'.41 The 
refractory conduct as indicated by Gardner, in the context of this thesis, is the 
conduct of the judges in applying the doctrine of state necessity in Pakistan. The 
researcher, therefore, does not fully agree with Gardner, as the constitutional 
history of Pakistan as critically evaluated in Chapter 3 has proved that democracy 
can be compromised to safeguard the unity and integrity of the state.  
The researcher for the first part of his thesis applies the list of steps set out by 
Hutchinson and Duncan to solve a specific legal problem using the doctrinal 
method.42 The researcher has adapted those steps into a four-step approach to 
conduct the research in this document. The first two steps are related to positivism 
and the remaining two steps to interpretivism. These steps are: 
1. Reading and evaluating background material 
2. Collecting relevant facts 
3. Analysing the issues 
4. Drawing a tentative conclusion 
In the context of this project, the background material entailed a broad stream of 
material and there was always a potential risk of focus shifting. To stay focused the 
researcher's rationale for selection was confined to the material directly related to 
the research questions. The other important issue was the authenticity and 
reliability of the background material.  
The scope of the background material to be considered was, therefore, limited to 
primary sources such as case law, and theoretical and analytic sources such as 
jurisprudence, philosophy and political science. The areas that came within the 
                                           
40 Simon Gardner, 'Instrumentalism and Necessity' (1986) 6(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 431 
431. 
41 ibid. 
42 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
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scope of the investigation were necessity, premature dissolution of legislatures, 
democratic federalism and the key factors chosen for analysis as discussed above.  
In the doctrinal method, sources of the law are located and then the law is 
interpreted and analysed.43 Locating the source of law is an attempt to determine 
an objective reality by the researcher.44 The researcher is locating the objective 
reality of what the law is rather than what it should be.  
The next step is to separate the relevant facts from the background material. In the 
context of this thesis, the facts are premature dissolutions in the name of necessity 
and self-interest. 
The third step is analysis. This is carried out throughout chapters 4 and 5 leading 
to the fourth step i.e., the conclusion given in Chapter 6. 
2.6 Techniques used in the Second Part of the Thesis (Comparative 
Law) 
Having focused in the first part of the analysis on the history and challenges facing 
Pakistan, the second part tends towards the future by investigating the extent to 
which the US template, already relied on to generate the key factors used in the first 
part of the analysis, could provide a solution. Here a comparative law approach was 
used. Comparative law is not to be confused with any branch of law, since it is a 
methodology and not itself a system of law but merely an approach to a legal 
inquiry.45 Comparative law is the comparison of the different legal systems of the 
world.46 It focuses on the similarities and differences between the laws or legal 
systems of two or more countries.47  
In order to address the hypothesis, the key topics of comparison in this case 
therefore include: as a similarity, the federal nature of both countries, their colonial 
origin (using a structural approach) and as a difference, their culture and identity 
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and their political system including the structure of government (using a 
functionalist approach). 
This technique should not be confused with comparative federalism. Comparative 
federalism comprises two main elements, i.e. a comparison of views on how 
governments operate their policies such as social welfare or immigration; and how 
case law compares from other federal systems in terms of their impact on policies 
and people.48 Neither of these two elements are under the microscope of this project.  
This research in the second part of the thesis does, however, benefit from 
comparative constitutionalism in 5.4. Comparative constitutional law is a concept 
that 'seeks to canvass ensuring answers to common constitutional questions'.49 
Comparative law not only determines universal principles required to understand 
legal systems to facilitate legal reform but also provides a logical argument to 
support any inference.50 Methods and techniques used in comparative analysis 
such as the historical, empirical, functional, structural, statistical, thematic and 
evolutionary are borrowed from other disciplines and applied to the issues of 
comparative law research.51 As indicated above, the researcher employs both 
structural and functional approaches to conduct his comparative inquiry.  
Structural Approach: 'Black-letter-law-oriented' and 'rule-based' comparative 
research combined is a kind of comparative law approach that is structural, 
because it relies on statutes, case law and doctrinal output.52 Data derived from the 
doctrinal analysis is used to identify similarities and differences from which to draw 
a conclusion.53 This kind of comparative law methodology compares a less 
functional system with a 'better law' and the rationale of determining a system 
'better law' is plausible, as it can be regarded as going beyond the 'common core' 
and thus beyond the limits of neutral comparativism.54 Better law implies a 
determination by the evaluative criteria set by the researcher.  
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Functional Approach: A functional approach is usually applicable at the level of 
micro-comparison from a broader perspective.55 A 'functional comparison' is the 
'study of how the same thing may be brought about, the same problem may be met 
by one legal institution or doctrine or precept in one body of law and by another 
and quite different institution or doctrine or precept in another'.56 A functional 
approach serves several goals such as: understanding law, comparing, focusing on 
similarities, building a system, determining the 'better law', unifying law, critical 
appraisal of the legal orders.57 There is a variety of functional methods such as 
problem-solving and institutional approaches that point to the importance of the 
research aim and research question for choosing an appropriate comparative 
method.58  
The problem-solving approach to comparative law used in this thesis looks at the 
way practical problems are dealt with in the two different countries according to 
their different legal systems.59 This approach allows those problems to be seen 
independently from the doctrinal framework of each of the compared legal systems. 
Legal concepts and legal procedures may sometimes deviate, but still the solutions 
given to some problems may be similar or even identical.60  
The institutional approach is a utilitarian approach to comparative law that 
determines points of counterpart in the two systems being compared, such as the 
political systems in the context of this thesis.61 This is also known as having 
'functional comparability' or carrying out 'functional juxtaposition' of comparable 
solutions.62 The institutional approach looks into 'functional equivalents' at the level 
of solutions. For example, in this thesis it is key to consider what arrangements the 
US political system offers to uphold equal representation, separate the three 
branches of government and counter any potentiality of self-interest that can 
improve the problem of Pakistan. 
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Functional-institutional analyses are made in many different ways, on the basis of 
a large variety of distinctions and criteria.63 All legal systems structurally have a 
commonality, which is linked to the definition of law as an identifiable system in 
any society.64 It becomes easy to identify those secondary rules in a legal system 
and compare them as to: who has the power to make law or to change the laws, 
such as (independent and separated legislature);65 who has the power to finally 
decide about the application of the law such as independent/separated judiciary; 
and who has to implement the law, such as separate/independent executive. 
The researcher combined these approaches to conduct his comparative inquiry, as 
the multiplicity of approaches enriches research possibilities.66 A structural 
approach is used to investigate similarities in the infrastructure of Pakistan and the 
USA in 5.1. A functional institutional approach is used in 5.2 to 5.3 to investigate 
the operational differences in the way the two systems are operated. A functional 
problem-solving approach is used in 5.5 to explore compatibility and adoption. 
In order to carry out the research reported in this document, Edward Eberle's four-
step process for comparative law has been used.67 This approach is concise, simple, 
and both structural and functional. 
• The skills of a comparativist 
• Evaluating external law 
• Evaluating internal law 
• Determining comparative observations 
2.6.1 The Skills of a Comparativist 
The researcher is sufficiently well-informed to carry out a comparative law approach 
effectively for a number of reasons. First, he has a background in academic study 
of political systems, including that of the USA, so is able to guard against the 
problems of lack of deep level knowledge referred to in the initial paragraph of this 
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section. Second, he has not only studied the political system of Pakistan but is 
qualified to practise as a lawyer in that jurisdiction, providing a useful insider 
insight into not only the political system, but the functioning of the political system 
in that country. 
There are limits to comparativism.68 Usually there is a risk that the lawyer 
attempting the comparison lacks a deep level of knowledge of culture specific 
concepts in one of the jurisdictions being studied and, as a result, has a 'culture 
deficit'.69 This limitation has already been addressed in 2.3 whilst exploring the 
position of the researcher as insider and outsider. 
The researcher proposes a completely different political system, in order to address 
an on-going issue of political instability. With such a proposition, the researcher is 
aware of the fact that a thorough knowledge of the systems to be compared is 
required. It is a calculated risk that, if the two systems 'are socio-culturally and 
legal-culturally diverse, then more problems are likely to be encountered'.70 
Through a functional-institutional approach, an institution is highlighted to a 
comparable equation of two objects, then the next step is to determine '[h]ow is a 
specific social or legal problem, encountered both in society A and society B, 
resolved?'71 This is to be achieved through a problem-solving approach. For 
instance, how is the issue of democratic federalism implemented in both countries? 
Schmitthoff argues that, 'the fact that the problem is one and the same warrants 
the comparability'.72 In this thesis the 'problem' Schmitthoff refers to is interpreted 
and used as the subject of the comparative exercise, i.e. post-colonial history and 
similar state structure. 
With the help of the comparative law approach, the legal rules and patterns of a 
given polity are understood.73 Whilst maintaining an impartial stance it is equally 
essential to understand a foreign culture, since its law really cannot be understood 
without this.74 For example, in order to understand the US political system, it is 
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necessary to understand the influence of the Enlightenment on Republicanism on 
US constitutional law. This is discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.6.2 Evaluating External Law 
Since the object of the research is Pakistan's political system, the 'external' in this 
context is the US political system and the 'internal' Pakistan's. 
In this step the emphasis is on external law as written or stated (positivist) and what 
meaning the words have within the context of the case, statute, or other legal factor 
(interpretivist).75 In positivist terms, the political system of Pakistan is designed to 
function properly, but in interpretivist terms an examination of how it is interpreted 
shows it does not. In simpler terms, it is really an exercise of compare and contrast. 
The compare and contrast approach raise the following questions to be addressed 
in Chapter 5:76 
• What is the meaning of the similarity and what provides its basis? 
• How do the similarities and differences translate across legal cultures? 
If the proposal was to adopt a complete US political constitution in its entirety as a 
reform to address the issues for the Pakistan, it would have been relevant to 
consider whether a transformation of the legal and political culture of Pakistan 
would be required. However, the hypothesis is that a Democratic Federal Political 
System (as defined in this thesis) might be adopted. The test shows in Chapter 5 
that the US political system closely complies with the Democratic Federal Political 
System. Nevertheless, the legal culture is one of the attributes for comparison in 
Chapter 5 at 5.2.2 whilst addressing the theological factors that are a significant 
factor of the culture of Pakistan. 
2.6.3 Evaluating Internal Law 
This is an important step and comprises analysing the legal culture of the system 
being compared, in this case that of Pakistan. 
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The key questions for this stage are:77 
• What set of rules do the two political systems follow? 
• How do these rules function?  
• How do these rules influence and form the legal culture? 
• What does the culture consist of? 
• How do the elements of the culture influence the law? 
These questions are answered in 5.1 to 5.4 under comparative analysis. 
2.6.4 Determining Comparative Observations 
According to the concept of 'contrarian challenge', the comparativist is expected to 
only consider differences and ignore the similarities.78 However, without grounds of 
similarity, any analysis of comparison is futile, for example, without the USA and 
Pakistan having a similar state structure, the application of the proposed system to 
the latter would not be practicable or convincing. The researcher is therefore more 
inclined to agree with Schmitthoff, according to whom similarities are the main 
focus of comparability.79 
This step assembles all the discoveries and draws a realistic conclusion. The focus 
in this step is on the key points. The questions below are answered taking into 
consideration similarities and differences in the legal systems.80 
The approach to comparative analysis in Chapter 5 is, as explained above, both 
structural and functional and involves answering the questions raised in the 
preceding paragraphs. However, as there is a large number of such questions, in 
order to make them practically useful, they have been merged and summarised as: 
What is the basis and the meaning of the similarity and differences and 
how do these translate across legal cultures? 
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According to the researcher’s position and in line with Schmitthoff, points of 
commonalities between two states are required to conduct a thorough and useful 
comparative analysis of the presence or absence of the key democratic federal 
factors and their application in the political systems of Pakistan and the USA. The 
investigation in this thesis has narrowed down the key points of similarities as the 
structure (state/government) of both countries.  
In this question, the 'basis' refers to the rationale for the researcher’s selection of 
the key points for comparison, which is the pragmatic implementation of the 
proposed political system, since a political system operates in a state and by 
extension in a government. It is therefore important to conduct a structural 
comparative analysis between the state and government structure of both countries. 
The 'meaning' in this question refers to the parameters of comparison of key points 
between the comparing countries. The outcome of the first stage analysis defined 
and set the parameters for the comparative analysis, i.e. the key factors of 
democratic federalism. The similarity in state structure shown in Chapter 5 reveals 
the implied presence of, or tendency towards, these key factors. The study of 
similarity or difference is therefore important for both states in terms of their origin, 
how they evolved, how, why and if they adopted these key factors.  
What set of rules do the both constitutions follow, their function, 
effectiveness and rationale? 
In Chapter 2, the constitutional history of Pakistan is divided into four phases and 
tested against the key factors drawn in part from the US template. The results of 
this test reveals whether the political systems it applied to were suitable systems 
according to the hypothesis of constitutional suitability. 
How do these rules influence the legal culture or law (if they do)? 
This question is explored in Chapter 4, that is, whether Pakistan's legal culture is 
influenced by any recognised and effective set of rules. There also appears to be 
occurrence of problematic practices such as varied actions of the judiciary, military 
rulers and politicians.  
In the case of the USA, explored further in Chapter 5, there are rules that played 
an important role in restructuring the country's political system, for example, by 
moving from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature and from indirect election of 
25 
 
the upper house to a direct one. Likewise, the separation of powers and checks and 
balances that are one of the key factors are enshrined in the country's 
constitution.81 
Can the key factors now be understood better? Is there something in the 
external law that can benefit or lead to improvement?  
The key factors are explored in Chapter 4 through a philosophical and 
jurisprudential lens, where their application, practical framework and 
implementation are recognised.  Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6. 
In the next chapter these key factors are thoroughly explored to lay the foundation 
for the further investigation in subsequent chapters. 
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3. Literature Review 
This chapter discusses key concepts that are relevant to the analysis in the thesis 
as a whole. The first of these is federalism, because the key factor of equal 
representation (in the sense used in this thesis) derived from the US political system 
stems from federalism. The chapter then moves on to discuss the key factors that 
are selected for the analysis in Chapter 3. It then discusses the doctrine of state 
necessity which forms a significant part of the analysis in Chapter 3, and finally, 
concludes with a discussion of the concept of state structure to lay the foundation 
for the structural comparative analysis in Chapter 5. 
3.1 Federalism 
The test employed in the first part of this thesis is, however, not one of federalism 
alone but one of democratic federalism. Democracy is a wide term which advocates 
rule of the majority or one man one vote. The researcher argues that in a federal 
arrangement this rule of majority manifests in a two dimensional paradigm. The 
first dimension is the rule of the majority relating to people of the entire polity (i.e. 
a democratic concept) and the second dimension relates to its federal character, i.e., 
the same people but classified as a sub unit or federating unit. Federalism and 
democracy therefore go side by side in a balanced manner in a democratic federal 
state. In this two-dimensional paradigm, in the first dimension, units with a larger 
population take advantage and in the second dimension the advantage of the first 
dimension is balanced by equal seat allocation of units regardless of their size or 
population. If this equation is not balanced, the disparity of representation 
discussed at 3.2 is a likely result. 
Consequently, the concept of federalism is significant for this thesis as the key 
factor of "equal representation" in the sense described below is a specifically federal 
concept.  
Federalism is an agreement to form a union providing for distribution of political 
powers on the territorial basis under some kind of charter, compromise or 
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constitution.82 In federalism, the powers and functions of the government are 
divided by a constitution between the central government and its federating units.83 
Sovereignty in a federal system is surrendered by the federating units to form a 
common sovereignty which can then be shared by them equally.84 An important 
feature that differentiates federalism from other arrangements is the preservation 
of the identity of people and the autonomy of the federating units. Livingstone notes 
that a federal government is a form of political and constitutional organisation that 
unites into a single polity a number of diversified groups or components of politics, 
so that the personality and individuality of the components are legally preserved, 
while created, in the new totality, as separate and distinct political constitutional 
units.85 
Several semi-autonomous federating units were united for a common purpose, i.e. 
to acquire independence from British colonial rule.86 The circumstances behind 
forming the federations of the USA and of Pakistan are set out in detail in Chapter 
4. In this section therefore, it is important to explore the philosophical reasoning 
behind the concept of federalism. It is argued that there are certain implied 
conditions that have to be met before forming a federation, the most important of 
which is the willingness to form a community. This spirit of community, as Dicey 
puts it, could be produced when these federating units have points of commonality 
amongst them.87 Alongside such commonality, the federal system must be designed 
in a way that the forming units can retain their individual regional identity and 
exercise some autonomy to shield the union from becoming a unitary state. 
According to Dicey, a federation is:  
'a body of countries so closely connected by history, by race, or the 
like, as to be capable of bearing in the eyes of their inhabitants an 
impression of common nationality, a very peculiar state of sentiments 
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among the inhabitants of countries which it purposes to unite. They 
must desire union and must not desire unity'.88 
In situations where there are wide differences among the individuals in terms of, for 
example, their political identity, culture, religion, or language, the unitary system 
becomes less effective. According to Ebenstein, federalism is the best option for 
states with large territories and cultural diversities.89 It is reasonable to assume 
therefore that a federal arrangement is the best possible model for a newly forming 
country (with diverse federating units) to adopt, especially in situations where a 
unitary system cannot be embraced.  
In the case of Pakistan, there are five completely different ethnicities who all have 
completely different traditions, habitat, culture and language.90 The issue of 
disparity in Pakistan remains unaddressed and present in its political. Pakistan has 
always been a polity of multiple geographic, economic and demographic variations. 
Khalid observes attributes such as multiple geographic, economic and demographic 
variations in Pakistan.91 Khalid rightly suggests that such attributes require special 
governance, for which her solution is a federal system.92 She observes that 
federalism is a delicate compromise between unity and autonomy that requires 
political maturity.93 She proposes equal representation of federating units in a 
federation where they surrender only a partial sovereignty and keep control of their 
local affairs.94 She claims that in the absence of equal representation, a successful 
federation can never operate, and maintains her argument by referring to the 
dominance of Prussia in the downfall of the German Empire and relating it to the 
secession of East Pakistan in 1971.95 
Khalid may, however, have weakened her position by relying on Dicey's view since 
he supported parliamentary sovereignty,96 which is to be contrasted with the 
doctrine of separation of powers, one of the factors in a democratic federal state. 
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Nevertheless, her notion of Pakistan (being a federation) operating as a unitary 
system leads the researcher to deduce that Pakistan in principle fulfils the factors 
of democratic federalism in its structure but is operating a political system that is 
not a suitable one. Khalid rightly observes, therefore, that political instability in 
Pakistan is the result of a discrepancy between the theory and practice of the federal 
arrangements in the political system.97 
3.2 Equal Representation 
In the context of this thesis, equal representation derives from a federal, rather than 
a democratic discourse. The concept of two dimensional representation in this 
thesis (as indicated in 3.1) connotes representation of people in a federation and 
representation of federating units in a state. In the first dimension as Locke agrees 
that there is an anthropological feature, which relates to the equality of individuals 
and their tendency to be recognised as free and equal.98 In Hobbes's state of nature, 
he proposes that individuals should create an authority (a sovereign) who can 
enforce laws for their good.99 Locke shares Hobbe’s views but with a slight deviation 
as he proposes an established government instead of a sovereign.100  
Montesquieu, on the other hand, believes that the people are sovereign and should 
govern through chosen representatives.101 The common point in the theories of 
these Enlightenment philosophers is that it is for the individuals to create or choose 
a body (sovereign or government) to govern them and/or enforce laws for their good. 
This raises a question whether one particular subgroup of individuals can choose a 
body for the rest of the group. This question is relevant since this practice is 
observed in Pakistan where, as described in Chapter 4, one group of people such as 
the electors of Punjab can form a government for the rest of the state.  This question 
of unbalanced and one dimensional representation is addressed by Rousseau to 
some extent, as he believes that a state can be legitimate only if it is guided by the 
general will of its members.102 Rousseau's views can be seen as indicative of 
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employing second dimension but explicit like Montesquieu (discussed later in this 
section). Rousseau's views are slightly different from some of the other 
Enlightenment philosophers insofar as the tenure of that representation is 
concerned.103 However, in any case, the majority of the Enlightenment philosophers 
advocated the concept of equal representation.  
It is argued that sovereignty is equivocal under the constitutional law of Pakistan, 
since there is a theological element to it as clearly stated in the Objectives 
Resolution described in 4.2, which serves as the preamble to the current 
constitution.  It asserts that sovereignty belongs to God and is delegated to the 
people to execute it as a sacred trust.104 The first Prime Minister Khan's views about 
representation are aligned with those of Montesquieu as Khan stated in his third 
postulate of the Objectives Resolution that '[t]he state shall exercise its powers and 
authority through the chosen representatives of the people'.105  
The Objectives Resolution is a generic document and does not allude to a particular 
political system and/or type of legislature (i.e. unicameral or bicameral). It is 
important to note, therefore, in the context of the hypothesis tested in this thesis, 
that a democratic federal political system is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
Objectives Resolution. 
To the researcher, it makes logical sense to have two dimensional representation in 
the form of two houses in the legislature of a federal state, one to represent the 
population and the other to represent the federating unit. Without such two 
dimensional representation, a disparity in representation is caused which 
ultimately compromises equal representation in a federal discourse. Equal 
representation in both dimensions is important as in this way the autonomy of the 
federating units is preserved. The latter is an implied stipulation of the federal units 
before becoming a part of the union: after all federalism is about division of powers 
between the centre and units. It is the responsibility of the state to serve its 
federating units equally.106 Failing that, there is always a potential risk of resistance 
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under the cloak of necessity and governments as a result can be, and are, 
overthrown in Pakistan.  
It is argued that disparity of representation also leads to secession attempts. This 
assertion is substantiated by the following examples: 
• In Pakistan, the Sindhudesh movement for the creation of an 
independent Sindhi state, first emerged in 1972 under the leadership of G M 
Syed.107 In March 2012 hundreds of thousands of people gathered to demand 
independence.108 
• Also in Pakistan, Baluchistan may be on the verge of secession as it 'poses 
what is widely seen as a near East Pakistan like threat'.109 
• The Scottish secession attempt of 2014, where some Scottish people 
demanded full decision-making power in regard to the political affairs of their 
nation. In the words of Alex Salmond 'the people who live in Scotland are 
best placed to make the decisions that affect Scotland'.110 
Pakistan faces the problem of disparity of representation of the provinces as an 
established fact, as discussed in 4.3 in more detail. One province alone – Punjab, 
hence the concerns of the groups in the first two bullet points above - can form a 
government in the lower house. This is due to its large population and ultimately 
the seat allocation reflects the unbalanced nature of this majority population in a 
single province. This might not have been such a huge issue had the upper house 
been directly elected. The problem is due to the indirect election of the upper house 
by the provincial assemblies. 
Montesquieu in addition to the first dimension of representation also envisaged 
about the second dimension as he argued that the legislature should be composed 
of two houses, each of which can prevent acts of the other from becoming law.111 
The checks and balances are therefore not only associated with the separation of 
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powers discussed in the next section but also between both houses of a bicameral 
legislature. These checks and balances ultimately protect the smaller states against 
the larger states, ensuring equal representation or, in other words, the integrity of 
the federation. The concept of a bicameral legislature is effective in almost all the 
federations in the world, however, in some countries such as the UK, the upper 
house serves a different purpose and is not the bicameral legislature envisaged by 
this thesis or by Montesquieu. 
The USA has been through this phase of disparity, which is explored in much more 
detail in Chapter 5 but can be summarised here as being the result of the earlier 
governments of the USA being unicameral bodies. This issue was addressed in the 
revised constitution which provided for a bicameral congress,112 and through the 
Connecticut Compromise, whereby members for the upper house were also to be 
directly elected by the people of that federating unit.113 The USA therefore 
incorporated the system of equal representation, a feature that is, as shown in 
Chapter 5, missing in Pakistan's political system. 
The researcher agrees with Montesquieu that the legislature should comprise two 
houses, because each of these houses can prevent inappropriate acts of the other. 
Montesquieu argues for confederal merger of small and large states within a country 
equally.114 The merger provides advantages to smaller states such as democratic 
participation and security against abuse of power.115 
3.3 Doctrine of Separation of Powers 
The doctrine of separation of powers is a key factor of a democratic federal system 
in the sense proposed in this thesis, because it ensures power is equally distributed 
within a state, which in turn pre-empts the abuse of power and maintains 
democracy. 
The separation of powers is useful for any state but especially plays a vital role in a 
democratic federal arrangement. Separation of powers is a doctrine advocated by 
Montesquieu, who supported the idea of separate government branches that would 
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check and be independent of each other to prevent abuse of power.116 In 
Montesquieu’s original doctrine of separation of powers there are essentially two 
branches of government i.e., the executive and the legislature.117 The third branch, 
the judicature, according to Montesquieu, is invisible as judicial power rests with 
the jury.118 
According to Montesquieu, a government must have certain features to provide its 
citizens with the greatest possible liberty.119 People invested with power are likely to 
abuse it and it is therefore important to define boundaries.120 Separation of the 
executive, legislative and judicial powers of government can prevent the abuse of 
powers. Different bodies exercising these powers can check the others if they try to 
abuse their powers. 
Locke also claims that legitimate government is based on the idea of separation of 
powers.121 He does not mention judicial power as a separate power and says that 
the legislative is supreme over the executive.122 
If Locke’s formulation of separation of powers is compared to the ideas of 
Montesquieu, they do not appear very different. Montesquieu also reaffirms the 
superiority of the legislative power and describes the executive power as having to 
do with international affairs and the judicial power as concerned with the domestic 
execution of the laws.123 One aspect of Locke’s theory of separation of powers is that 
it does not preclude unelected officials from having some of the legislative power.124 
The researcher believes that it is important in a federation to have elected members 
in the upper house so that they can best protect the interest of their federating unit. 
Locke's theory is more relevant to the British constitutional system where, unlike 
the US Senate, the upper house is composed of unelected members. Locke's theory 
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is therefore less functional when it comes to equal representation in a bicameral 
legislature in the sense discussed in this thesis. 
Montesquieu’s separation of powers greatly influenced the framers of the 
constitution of the United States of America, the comparator jurisdiction in the 
comparative analysis in Chapter 5.125 In September 1787, when the US Constitution 
defined the new government, it resolved the differences among the federating units 
on the issue of equal representation by adopting a bicameral legislature.126 The 
Constitution provides for a government composed of three branches: the legislative, 
executive, and judicial. Each is given certain powers over the others to ensure that 
there are appropriate checks and balances.127  
The Constitution balances the authority of the states and the federal government 
and collectively the federal government being divided into three branches 
safeguards the nation by ensuring that no one gains too much control.128  
Each branch of government can change acts of the other branches. Below are the 
examples from the US model, which are explained in more detail in Chapter 5, but 
briefly highlighted here as: 
• The president's power to veto laws passed by Congress and vice versa.  
• The president's power to appoint Supreme Court judges. 
• Congress has the power to ratify appointments made by presidents. 
• Congress has the power to impeach the president, for example three 
presidents have been tried historically, nevertheless, none of the presidents 
has ever been impeached. 
• The Supreme Court can nullify unconstitutional laws. 
Unlike the USA, judicial power in the sub-continent, along with other powers, was 
all vested in the executive (Sultan), i.e. the monarch until 1858, when, as described 
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in Chapter 3,  the British took over from the Mughals.129 To govern and effectively 
rule this new colony, the British parliament passed some items of legislation such 
as the Government of India Act 1858, the Government of India Council Act 1861, 
the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, the Government of India Act 1919 and finally 
the Government of India Act 1935.130  
Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, In the early constitutional history of 
Pakistan, the Governor General (or later the President), enjoyed enormous 
powers.131 He, as an executive head, had the power to appoint the prime minister, 
the federal ministers, the heads of the armed forces, the governors of the provinces 
and the judges of the higher judiciary.132  
Discussion in Chapter 4 and then Chapter 6 will show that the unbalanced 
distribution of powers between the three branches has caused instances of political 
instability in Pakistan, which has not only diminished the growth of democracy in 
the country but also caused one successful and several attempted secessions. These 
secession attempts are explored further in detail in Chapter 4.  
In the next section, the doctrine of state necessity is discussed.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, it is particularly important to understand the concept of equal 
representation in terms of its relationship with this doctrine in the Pakistani 
context.  
3.4 Doctrine of State Necessity 
The discussion of state necessity is important for this thesis. As shown in Chapter 
4, the judicial recourse to the doctrine of necessity in Pakistan appears to be at the 
apex of a pyramid and the factors leading to it are what appears to be the missing 
key factors of democratic federalism. 
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Necessity is a common law doctrine that provides a justification for otherwise illegal 
government actions during an emergency.133 It therefore bridges the gap between 
what the law allows the government to do and the government's actual response to 
an emergency: 'It has no relevance where emergency state['s] action is taken 
pursuant to specific statutory or constitutional [authorisation]'. 134  
According to Schmitt, a state of exception is similar to a state of emergency 
(necessity) but based in the sovereign's ability to transcend the rule of law in the 
name of the public good. Schmitt argues that no legal factor such as a political 
system or constitution can govern an extreme case of emergency or state of 
exception.135 According to Schmitt, legal factors cannot be applied to chaos, they 
require a 'homogeneous medium'.136 In an emergency, the application of the laws 
through the usual administrative and judicial channels leads to chaotic 
consequences.137 
In the light of Schmitt's assertion, the sovereign in the case of Pakistan would be 
the person or institution that invokes necessity, and therefore the state of exception 
is the same, in practice, as a circumstance in which a state of necessity 
determination is justified. 
According to Schmitt, the issue is whether it is possible to establish legal conditions 
for declaring a state of emergency along with constraints.138 If the decision of 
declaring an emergency is not subject to any legal constraint it becomes 
discretionary.139 Therefore if the judges in Pakistan will always endorse the actions 
of the politicians or the military, it in effect creates discretionary power in the 
Pakistani judiciary, in the absence of the factors such as separation of powers 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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Schmitt believes it to be impossible to anticipate the nature of future emergencies 
and predict a solution. In his view it is not important to have a law in place that 
determines who can take a decision in the state of exception: 140 'There can be a 
'sovereign authority, even where such an authority is not recognized by 
constitutional law'.141 
The quotation above seems to suggest a highly realist or cynical analysis in that it 
depends who has the greatest power (possibly the military). All that matters is 
whether there exists a person or institution (i.e. a sovereign) with the ability to take 
a decision on the exception. The sovereign's act of suspending the law does not 
require legal recognition since 'the law's applicability itself depends on a situation 
of normality secured by the sovereign'.142 This situation, when seen through the 
lens of the constitutional history of Pakistan, leaves the country in an untenable 
position. In theory the armed forces of Pakistan are subordinate to the government, 
but history has proved otherwise, for example, in the case of the three military 
regimes described in Chapter 4. 
Schmitt believes that the act of emergency must be supported by a sufficiently large 
and powerful constituency, otherwise such acts could hardly possess the factual 
capability to suspend the law and to act successfully against the perceived 
emergency.143 Most of the time, dictators in Pakistan have initially ratified their act 
of dissolution through the judiciary in the name of necessity,144 then formed a 
government with a sufficiently large and powerful constituency,145 albeit one which 
is un-representative of the country as a whole and in particular, certain provinces 
that have only a minority of the population. 
The Latin maxim necessitas legem non habet (i.e. 'necessity has no law') used in the 
cases mentioned in Chapter 4 was interpreted by Giorgio Agamben in setting out 
his theory of state of exception in two different ways, i.e. 'necessity does not 
recognize any law' and 'necessity creates its own law' (nécessité fait loi).146 He argues 
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that the state of exception, which was meant to be a provisional measure, has 
become a normal practice of government in the twentieth century.147  
Agamben traced the evolution of the state of exception at least in part to the views 
of Carl Schmitt. The state of exception depends, he argued, on a conception of 
necessity, usually the survival of the state.148 It stems, he concluded, from the 
Roman law of iustitium, where the suspension of law was legitimate during times of 
necessity.149 
The state of exception is, therefore, the enhancement of the executive power to have 
the force of law. The separation of powers no longer limits the executive branch. 
Separation of powers is one of the key factors of a democratic federal state and when 
it is compromised due to a state of exception, the situation is paradoxical, because 
state of exception, it is argued is created due to factors being either missing or 
operating in a diminished form. Although there has never been any separation of 
powers in the constitutional history of Pakistan, nevertheless, the executive has had 
authority over the other two branches by dissolving one (i.e. the legislature) and 
obtaining support from the other (i.e. the judiciary). In the case of a military coup, 
the military dictator is de-facto the executive branch. Agamben observes that the 
continuous application of the state of exception will eventually lead to a (global) civil 
war.150 The relevance of this phenomenon to this thesis is that when a state of 
exception is created in Pakistan, those in power try to pre-empt any potential civil 
war, secession or outbreak by invoking necessity in a way which justifies premature 
dissolution of government as demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
Another key writer relevant to the discussion of state necessity is Stanley de Smith. 
Although de Smith's version of necessity does not correspond to the state of 
exception mentioned by Schmitt and Agamben, the views of de Smith are important 
as his ideas were relied on by the judiciary in Pakistan in the Asma Jilani case 
discussed at 4.3. De Smith also commented on CJ Munir's decision that there was 
not a situation of necessity in 1955 in the Maulvi Tamizuddin case, also discussed 
at 4.3, which was the first time necessity was ever used to justify an act of 
dissolution of the legislature in Pakistan. The act of dissolution of the constituent 
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assembly by the Governor General was not seen by de Smith as an instance of 
necessity, it was mainly related to self-interest as the Governor General objected to 
the constitution the Assembly was about to pass.151  
De Smith observed that state necessity had been accepted by the Pakistani judiciary 
as a legal justification for unconstitutional actions 'to fill a vacuum'.152 He did not, 
however set out any criteria to identify what unconstitutional actions are. Article 6 
of the 1973 constitution lists unconstitutional acts and their punishments, but in 
spite of their presence General Zia and General Musharraf were, as explained at 
4.3, granted immunity from those repercussions.153  
De Smith believed necessity is an 'implied exception to the letter of the 
constitution'.154 Again he gives no rationale for, or limitation of, the state of 
exception (necessity). Nevertheless, de Smith is, it is argued, justified in asserting 
that in order to carry out an action arising out of necessity, an implied exception 
requires implied powers. In other words, and arguably, the constitution of Pakistan, 
like that of the USA, also carries implied powers in the form of implied exceptions. 
De Smith's position is contrary to that of Schmitt, who appeared to think that a 
legal framework justifying an exception to itself could not exist. 
Virk believes that it was not appropriate to justify any of the acts of dissolution that 
have occurred in Pakistan on the basis of state necessity.155 On the basis of the 
argument set out above, however, it is suggested that, on the contrary, some 
element of justifiable reliance on the doctrine of necessity is identifiable in each of 
the acts of dissolution. Those elements of necessity included, for example, in the 
Nusrat Bhutto and Musharraf cases discussed in 4.3, serious political crises leading 
to a breakdown of the constitutional machinery and risk of dissension among the 
armed forces threatening the integrity and sovereignty of the country respectively. 
The final section of the literature review is about state structure, which is the basis 
of the structural comparative analysis in Chapter 5.  
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3.5 State Structure 
The concept of state structure is significant because it serves as a variable of 
commonality for comparative analysis. The working hypothesis, as described in 2.2 
above, is that the USA and Pakistan have similarity in their state structure, yet they 
adopted different political systems. For the purposes of this thesis, 'state structure' 
refers to the composition and origin of a country. According to Montesquieu, a 
'confederate republic' with separation of powers allows equality and identity within 
or between small member units which serve as checks on each other.156 
Hume does not agree with Montesquieu's suggested advantages of smaller states. 
He recommends a federal arrangement for deliberation of laws involving both 
member unit and central legislatures, whereby member units enjoy several powers 
and participate in central decisions, but their laws and court judgments can always 
be overruled by the central bodies.157  However, in order to safeguard the unity of 
the state, it is argued that the (federal) state should have priority above the 
individual units.  This argument is supported by Hume’s contention that central 
government should have powers to overrule the laws and judgments of units.158 
It is worth mentioning in this section that in 1869, a secession attempt during the 
civil war by Texas was invalidated by the Supreme Court of the USA in the famous 
case of Texas v White.159 In this judgment the Supreme Court declared that the 
United States was 'an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states'.160 
The opinion of the Chief Justice in Texas v White has been 'widely accepted as being 
the final word on the issue of the legality of secession from the perspective of US 
constitutional law.161 
In Texas v White, the Court seems to have categorically blocked the prospect of 
secession in a way that has not been the case in Pakistan. The reasons why this 
has been the case in the USA and not in Pakistan are explored further in Chapter 
5. It is however worth noting the consequences of unlimited overruling powers of 
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the federal government against individual federating units as a potential danger to 
the entire concept of equal representation of the provinces. 
The early US anti-federalists such as Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee and Samuel 
Adams were highly concerned about the unlimited powers that the federal 
government could exercise.162 Their concerns give rise to the introduction of the US 
Bill of Rights ratified in 1791.163 The Bill of Rights in the first ten amendments 
guarantees a number of freedoms, limits the government's powers and reserves 
some powers to the states and the people.164  
The authors of The Federalist Papers, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton 
agreed with Hume that the risk of potential tyranny by 'passionate majorities' was 
reduced in larger republics where member units of shared interest would check 
each other.165 Madison and Hamilton were concerned to address issues of undue 
centralization and their solution was the appropriate composition of the central 
authority.166 
The philosophical discussions concerning federalism and form of government set 
out above have addressed several issues such as the reasons and need for 
federalism, equal representation, the legitimate division of powers between member 
units and the centre and the systems of checks and balances. In order to 
understand how the founding fathers of the USA addressed these issues and 
incorporated federalism, a further exploration is carried out at 5.1.1.   
The next chapter explores the evolution of the constitution of Pakistan within its 
historical context, the instances of irregular regime change and the unusual 
recourse to the doctrine of necessity to justify it. 
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4. Constitutional, Historical and Political Background 
In order to understand the more analytical sections of the thesis in 4.3 and chapter 
5, it is necessary first to include an overview of the key constitutional, historical 
and political events to which they refer. 
Constitutional law and its practice in Pakistan have evolved over a period of 
decades, during the course of which there has been a background of ongoing 
political instability for many reasons. However, so as to retain the focus on the 
research questions of this thesis, this section discusses only the extent to which 
this evolution demonstrates, or fails to demonstrate, the key factors of equal 
representation and separation of powers which are amongst those chosen for the 
purposes of subsequent analysis over that period. 
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic,167 which is comprised of four 
provinces.168 At the central level, the powers are shared and co-ordinated between 
the executive, the legislature and the judicature.169 The central legislature, known 
as parliament, is comprised of two houses, i.e. the National Assembly (lower house) 
and the Senate (upper house). Members of the national assembly (MNAs) are directly 
elected, whereas the members of the Senate (Senators) are indirectly elected by the 
four provincial assemblies. The Prime Minister is the leader of the party in the 
majority in the lower house of parliament and is the sole head of executive 
government. The President is indirectly elected by the parliament and is a 
ceremonial figurehead who represents the unity of the state. Parliamentary seats 
are allocated by way of proportional representation, there are a total of 342 seats in 
the National Assembly, out of which 174 are allocated to the most populous 
province Punjab.170 The majority required to form a government is 172 seats.171 
Whether one party can win in Punjab is irrelevant, but technically, if a party wins 
all the National Assembly seats allocated to Punjab, it can form a government. This 
seat allocation clearly shows the supremacy of one province, which can in turn 
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control all the other provinces by forming a government, that is a source of the 
problem defined at 3.2 as disparity of representation.  
The problem of premature dissolutions in Pakistan is a matter of its constitutional 
history explored in the next section. In the next section it is therefore very important 
to analyse the evolution of federalism in British India, and how it is related to 
Pakistan's present political instability. 
4.1 Launch of Federalism in British India 
This section covers the aspects of federalism and its evolution before and after the 
creation of Pakistan. These analyses will demystify the core causes behind the 
country's struggle in adopting the factors of democratic federalism selected for the 
purpose of analysis in this thesis. These findings will also distinguish between 
federalism as adopted by Pakistan and how the researcher analyses it according to 
his hypothesis of constitutional suitability in 4.3.5 and in Chapter 6. It is important 
to contextualise pre-Pakistan federalism as practised during British Rule and how 
the current model of federalism in Pakistan has been evolved from that concept. It 
is argued that the federalism implemented by the British Empire was to benefit the 
colonial arrangement and not necessarily the post-colonial countries. This section 
will also show how the British applied the concept of federalism in a completely 
different way from that of any other prominent federal democracy. This section 
supplements the theoretical discussion of federalism in Chapter 3 by exploring the 
varied or applied form of federalism used in Pakistan, along with its evolutionary 
origin that traces back to the later 1700s. 
At that period, the British colonised and ruled India, through the East India 
Company initially, and then three independent presidencies were set up, each 
responsible for their own remit.172 After the fall of the Mughal dynasty, the British 
introduced for the first time a system of devolution of powers from the centre to the 
provinces where the interest of the Empire was ultimate.173 The Office of Governor 
General was created by the Regulatory Act 1773 to subordinate all these 
presidencies.174 The Governor General was assisted by a council called the executive 
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council,175 which had legislative powers vested in it by the British Parliament. 
Further reforms to the act enhanced the position of the Governor General in the 
executive council.176 The presidencies were later given the status of provinces or 
dominions and given certain administrative and legislative powers.177 A judiciary 
was already present to interpret law.178 Consequently, the government was 
comprised of a legislative body, an executive (council) and a judiciary where powers 
were also devolved to provinces. This arrangement could only benefit the rulers 
rather than the subjects or the federating units as it gave the Crown better control 
over the colony to enact laws and impose lagans (taxes). Another reason for its non-
federal aspect was that the central government had enormous overriding powers 
with the result that the factor of equal representation described at 3.1 as a 
necessary element of a truly democratic federal state, was missing.179 There is a 
great similarity between this arrangement and Pakistan's federal arrangements 
since Pakistan's inception to date, therefore the model of federalisation adopted by 
Pakistan is not the one envisaged by this thesis. 
4.2 History of Constitutional Instruments 
The constitutions of Pakistan have evolved from these preceding colonial 
constitutional instruments. It is important, before evaluating the four phases of 
Pakistan’s constitutional history using the key factors, to describe the 
constitutional instruments in some detail. 
The British attempt to articulate and define the province-centre relationship 
resulted in the creation of the Indian Council Act 1892. According to this Act, local 
representatives were involved in the government. This Act also incorporated 
enlargement of legislative councils and elective elements to the government,180 
which resulted for the first time in the adoption of elections (albeit indirect). 
Nevertheless, this Act also retained the overriding powers of the Governor General 
in Council. 
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Soon after the adoption of the 1892 Act, the British Government realised the need 
for decentralisation and for the involvement of locals in the government.181 The 
Royal Commission of Decentralisation (1907), appointed by Edward VII, 
recommended limiting the role of the Government of India, which resulted in the 
Indian Council Act 1909.182 This Act enhanced the first dimensional representation 
feature of the country. Nevertheless, it did not improve the relations, or co-
ordination, between the centre and the provinces.183 The 1909 Act modified through 
the Government of India Act 1912, gave some financial powers to the provinces to 
frame their budget. As a result of the continuous motivation and struggle of the two 
largest political parties i.e. Congress and the Muslim League, and the break out of 
the First World War, a declaration was made by the British Government promising 
new constitutional reforms.184 These reforms resulted in the creation of the 
Government of India Act 1919. 
The Act of 1919 introduced a bicameral legislature at the centre,185 which comprised 
at the time the Legislative Assembly (lower house) and the Council of State (Upper 
House). The Act also divided powers between the centre and the provinces, leaving 
the Governor General with residuary powers.186 The Governor General also 
appointed provincial governors who would report to him. The same rule is in place 
to date in Pakistan, which appears redundant now since their offices do not have 
operational powers under the constitution.  
It is reasonable to suggest that the Government of India Act 1919 made some 
progression towards provincial autonomy by sharing some of the federal powers - 
including financial powers - between the centre and the provinces. Nevertheless, 
the reform did not address the issue of disparity of representation amongst 
federating units.187 The political parties AIML and Congress were not satisfied with 
the distribution of powers and launched movements against British Imperialism, 
i.e. the Khilafat Movement and the non-cooperation movement respectively.188 
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From 1927, both the prominent parties AIML (ethnic minority party) and Congress 
(majority party) started demanding a federal model in India.189 AIML wanted a 
federation with a weaker centre whereas Congress was in favour of stronger central 
government as they were in the majority and could therefore dominate the centre. 
This unsettling dispute triggered the Simmon Commission in 1930 favouring a 
federal government in a united India and ultimately the Government of India Act 
1935 was passed by the British Government.190 
Although the Government of India Act 1935 can be regarded as the first ever federal 
constitution for India and later for Pakistan too, it is argued that it lacked the key 
factors of democratic federalism identified in Chapter 3. Critically, there were no 
provisions for the second dimensional representation or separation of powers.  
After its creation in 1947, it took Pakistan nine years to produce the first 
Constitution in 1956.191 The country was run under the Government of India Act 
1935 during the early stages after its partition from India. The 1935 Act did not 
have significant influence over the running of the governmental machinery because 
it was not a piece of legislation which was passed by the sovereign legislature of 
Pakistan. Until 1956, the country only had a document called the 'Objectives 
Resolution' adopted in 1949 that laid down the foundations of future constitutions 
in Pakistan.192 This also served as a preamble for the constitutions of 1956, 1962 
and 1973 and has been annexed to the current constitution of Pakistan since 
1985.193  
4.3 Testing against the key factors of a Democratic Federal Political System 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the second sub-question, "Are the present and past 
political systems Democratic Federal ones?" contains three further questions. This 
test will be applied to the political system as it was in place in each of four 
consecutive periods starting from 1935. Although Pakistan was created in 1947, 
the first period for the analysis starts from 1935 because, as described in the 
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preceding section, the first legislation Pakistan ever adopted was the Government 
of India Act 1935. 
The questions for the sake of clarity are reiterated below: 
1. Does the political system address issues of equal representation?194 
2. Does the political system provide for separation of powers and checks and 
balances?195 
3. Are there elements of self-interest exercised by influential individuals that 
can override the controls in the system?196 
The first question, whether there is or is not equal representation can be examined 
by taking a subjective, interpretivist approach. This factor was selected for the 
purpose of this test because it is important for a Political System to have a balanced 
representation whereby not only the population but also the federating units are, 
as explained at 3.2, equally represented.  It is also, as explained in Chapter 5, a key 
component of the US political system. 
The answer to the second question can be established objectively. In this question 
reliance is placed on a positivist approach to determine whether or not a rule exists 
in an established system.197 This factor was selected for the purpose of this test 
because this factor adds to political stability and reduces the risks of premature 
dissolution. It is also, as explained in Chapter 5, a key component of the US system. 
The third question is not a question of fact and can be examined only by taking a 
subjective, interpretivist approach alongside a legal realist approach in which any 
possible influences behind the judges’ reasoning are examined. This factor was 
selected for the purpose of this test because of its detrimental nature towards the 
progression of democracy since this element stems from the vice regal time.   
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It is conceded that these factors come from the US political system, and the test 
may appear redundant at first glance since it can be foreseen that these factors are 
not present in the political systems of Pakistan and it is inevitably going to fail. 
However, the purpose of the test is to conduct a thorough analysis in terms of how 
it fails and to what extent these factors are not employed. In addition, this analysis 
will also uncover why these factors are so important and explore in the next section 
as to how useful these can be if implemented. 
The constitutional history of Pakistan is divided in four phases in this section, where 
an analysis of the cases involving judicial encouragement (of premature dissolution) 
is carried out. From a legal realist standpoint, it is noted whether this judicial 
encouragement was affected by some coercive or other influence over the judges 
who made such decisions.  
4.3.1 The Pre-Constitution Phase (1935 – 1956) 
The Government of India Act 1935 provided for setting up a federation consisting of 
Indian provinces (totalling 11 in number) and princely states.198 The division of 
powers was comprised of three lists of subjects, i.e., federal, provincial and 
concurrent.199 Residuary powers were vested in the Governor General who exercised 
them as he pleased. 
The 1935 Act almost gave the federating units a federal autonomy.200 However, there 
were certain constraints provided by the special powers given to provincial 
governors. The Governor General had legislative powers as he could pass 
ordinances and governor's Acts without having to seek consent from the provincial 
legislature and he could also withhold his assent from the passing of provincial 
legislation or veto the entire bill.201 
The provincial governor could also proclaim an emergency and put the whole 
province under federal authority.202 It is remarkable to note that this power 
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continues to be present in the evolved constitution as late as February 2009 when 
Governor Rule was implemented in Punjab. 
The most important and relevant provision of the 1935 Act is that it gave the 
Governor General powers to issue a proclamation of emergency in the entire country 
and assume powers.203 This power was, as we shall see, exercised in its original and 
its evolved shape several times in the constitutional history of Pakistan. 
Although a bicameral legislature was adopted under the 1935 Act, there was no 
equal representation in the upper house.204 In the lower house the dilemma was no 
different from that which Pakistan still faces, that is seat allocations. However, the 
historical position under the 1935 act was illogical in a rather different way from 
the current position. Allocation was distributed not on the basis of size of population 
but by reference to the perceived importance of the state.  For example, Bombay, 
with a population of 18 million, was allocated 16 seats, whilst Bengal, with a 
population of 20 million, had 20 seats.205 Likewise, in Royal India the Princely States 
were also given peculiar representations, their total population was 23% and yet 
they were given an allocation of 33% of the seats in the lower house and 40% in the 
upper house.206 In fact, the creation of Pakistan itself can be construed as the 
disintegration of India as the result of lack of one of the key factors selected for the 
purposes of analysis here i.e. equal representation of all dominions. 
As the Act of 1935 clearly and greatly empowered the agent of the Empire i.e., the 
Governor General, it is reasonable to infer that the legislation was designed to 
preserve the crown’s supremacy. There is, it is argued, evidence of British self-
interest behind the design of the 1935 mode. The decisive authority was vested in 
the British Parliament rather than the Indian parliament. The Viceroy or Governor 
General was granted enormous powers including, but not limited to, legislative and 
executive powers. The Act fails to implement equal representation to the extent that 
even the chief executive was unelected. There was no separation of powers as all 
the powers were vested in the Viceroy and, most importantly, there were no checks 
and balances on this chief executive. Democratic federalism and the key factors 
selected for the purposes of analysis, it is argued, cannot be achieved without 
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sovereignty, mainly because of the diminished will or say of the people. India was 
not a sovereign state but a colony and, on this analysis, any so-called federal 
constitution given to her by the Empire was therefore de facto non-federal and non-
democratic. 
Despite its diminished functionality, the 1935 Act was adopted both by India and 
Pakistan in 1947 as they did not have their own constitutions at the time. 
Since the provision allowing the governor general to proclaim an emergency was still 
present in the 1935 Act, the first Pakistani legislature was dissolved in 1954 by the 
then Governor General. The Act of the Governor General was argued to be 
unconstitutional in the Maulvi Tamizuddin case.207 However, it is argued here that 
although the act may have appeared unconstitutional, it was not strictly speaking 
in violation of the 1935 Act, in fact it was not unlawful at all since the act of 
declaring an emergency was within his powers under the prevailing legislation.208 
This case was the first time in the history of Pakistan that the doctrine of necessity 
was invoked. The Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly before the 
expiry of its due term and Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan contested the act of dissolution 
and filed two petitions209 in the Chief Court of Sindh seeking: 
• A petition for mandamus against the Federation of Pakistan and the 
reconstituted Council of Ministers prohibiting them from interfering with his 
functions as President of the Constituent Assembly.  
• A Writ of quo warranto challenging the validity of the appointment of the 
members of the reconstituted Council of Ministers. 
In his ruling, Chief Justice Munir said that 'necessity knows no law', in line with 
Braxton’s maxim,210 'which is otherwise not lawful is made lawful by necessity' and 
the Roman dictum, 'the wellbeing of the people is the supreme law'. 
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Neither of the petitions was granted and CJ Munir's judgment justified the act of 
the Governor General. However, this was not the end of this episode, as the case 
would be relied on again in 1958 in support of Ayub Khan's assertion of martial law 
and abrogating the 1956 Constitution; in 1978 to legalise the military takeover of 
General Zia ul Haq, and in 2000 justifying General Pervez Musharraf’s overthrow of 
Nawaz Sharif’s Government. 
As demonstrated at 3.4, both Virk and de Smith concluded that no such necessity 
existed in this situation.211 However, timing is of the essence in this case. Pakistan 
was a newly formed state, which was struggling with devising its first constitution, 
limited resources and perpetual pressure from the Indian right wing who were not 
happy about the partition. Such political instability was only weakening the country 
and increasing the risk of being taken over by India. Not that it could be foreseen 
at the time, but during 1971, India took advantage of Pakistan's political crises and 
aided East Pakistan to secede to form Bangladesh. It is therefore suggested that, 
taking a legal realist approach, the very being of Pakistan was in danger and thus 
reliance by the judiciary on the doctrine of necessity was pragmatic, feasible, 
inevitable and justified.  
This act of the Governor General and its ratification by the judiciary set a precedent 
for judicial endorsement of subsequent premature dissolutions. It is argued that, 
since it was within the powers of the Governor General to dissolve the legislature, 
the courts had limited scope to overturn the decision challenged through the Maulvi 
Tamizuddin case.212 However, the judges in this case relied on the doctrine of 
necessity instead of adopting a purely constitutional stance. Taking a constitutional 
stance would have ratified the act of the Governor General under Section 102 of the 
Government of India Act 1935. 
Although the judiciary may have seen circumstances at the time warranting 
necessity, nonetheless, the reason for the dissolution of the first legislature by 
Governor General Ghulam Mohammad was a personal one. His self-interest was 
based on his own objection to the constitution which the Assembly was about to 
adopt.213 Self-interest or not, it was nonetheless at his discretion under Section 102 
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of the 1935 Act to proclaim an emergency and dissolve the legislature. It is clearly 
contrary to the principle of separation of powers to vest such absolute power 
absolutely.  
After and during the ruling in the Maulvi Tamizuddin case and in the absence of a 
constitution, the judiciary had no option but to either rely on the 1935 Act or make 
a novel decision, and therefore the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad 
promulgated Emergency Ordinance IX 1995 giving himself the power to frame the 
constitution. 
This phase clearly does not demonstrate the key factors, because: 
1. There were no reforms to uphold equal representation. 
2. There were no instruments creating separation of powers or a checks and 
balances system. 
3. There were elements of self-interest, firstly vested in the Governor General in 
the Pre-Pakistan arrangement in favour of the British Empire and later on 
inherited by the Pakistani Governor General who was simply not in favour of 
the constitution the assembly was about to pass.214 
Even if it is argued that a necessity did not exist, the Governor General had the 
powers to dissolve the government and assume powers over the entire country and 
that is exactly what he did when he gave the country its first own constitution in 
1956. 
4.3.2 The First Constitution (1956 – 1962) 
Unlike the preceding instrument, the Constitution of 1956 provided for a 
unicameral legislature. As discussed in 3.2, representation in a federation should 
operate in two dimensions, however a unicameral legislature is a one dimensional 
entity. At the time, Pakistan comprised two territorial units i.e. East and West 
Pakistan, which were separated geographically from each other by over 750 miles. 
Apart from commonality in religion and the struggle for independence, everything 
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else such as culture, habitat, traditions and language were different. In the words 
of Ahmad: 
The two wings differ in all matters, excepting two things, namely, 
that they have a common religion, barring a section of the people in 
[the] East Pakistan and that we achieved our independence by a 
common struggle. These are the two points, which are common to 
both the wings of Pakistan; with the exception of these two things 
particularly everything [else] is different.215 
It was therefore entirely reasonable for East Pakistan to demand equal 
representation in the form of a bicameral legislature due to a substantial geographic 
and demographic disproportion between the two wings of the country. West 
Pakistan, however, was in favour of one dominion, which resulted in East Pakistan 
being underrepresented in the legislative assembly.  
Although this constitution provided for an independent supreme judiciary to settle 
disputes between the federal and provincial government,216 nevertheless, it is 
argued that the arrangement did not fully conform with the factor of separation of 
powers. The reason is that the constitution under Article 129 provided powers to 
the Supreme Court to settle disputes by constituting a tribunal whose report should 
be considered final and binding. However, no such tribunal was ever formed during 
the tenure of this constitution. This arrangement was therefore ineffective since 
disputes over several issues did exist between the federal and the provincial 
governments and there was no tribunal to resolve them.217 
For the purposes of this research project, in essence the new constitution was not 
significantly different from its predecessor, the 1935 Act. The President (formerly 
Governor General) still had emergency powers.218 These emergency powers were 
unlimited, which allowed him to dissolve provincial governments as well as the 
federal government.219 
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According to Article 191, an emergency could be proclaimed by the President, if he 
was satisfied that security or economic life was in jeopardy from external aggression 
or internal disturbance. Mehmood Ali of the then legislative assembly stated: 
We understand threat of war, we understand external aggression, 
but we do not understand what is meant by internal disturbance. A 
movement against a particular measure of the government for the 
time being may be interpreted as internal disturbance.220 
There is no guidance or rationale in the text of the constitution as to what 
constitutes an emergency. That absolute power remained unchanged from the 
preceding instruments, possibly to preserve the incentive of self-interest. The use 
of Article 193 to suspend provincial governments and to interfere in provincial 
affairs through governors weakened the democratic process.221 The provincial 
governor prorogued the assembly in East Pakistan several times upon the advice of 
central government, for example in May 1956 over a budget crisis and in August 
1956 over a dispute about legislation.222 
Another example of the central government's interference with the provincial 
government's affairs is the presidential ordinance in September 1958 ordering the 
restoration of six disqualified assembly members. This created a riot in the assembly 
resulting in the death of the deputy speaker.223 
In West Pakistan, Article 193 was also used to save a centrally favoured local 
government from a defeat.224 The use of these emergency powers was highly 
contentious at the time in both of the provinces: it was regarded as highly 
undemocratic.225 This use of these powers was a straightforward demonstration of 
elements of self-interest: 
If the theory is accepted that the central ministry must necessarily 
be formed by parties which are in power in the provinces or vice 
versa, the working of the constitution which provides for a central 
government and two autonomous provincial governments will often 
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become impossible. The [centre] will then always be prompted to 
protect itself by using or misusing its power to keep only conformist 
governments in office in both [of] the provinces and to keep out of 
office the [non-conformist] group by using rough and ready methods 
or by resorting to intrigue and seduction or by even applying section 
193 of the constitution.226 
Due to continued unrest and issues in implementation of the constitution, President 
Iskander Mirza annulled the constitution of 1956, dissolved all the legislatures and 
imposed martial law in 1958. Although not directly related, but the famous case of 
Dosso Vs Federation of Pakistan227 inadvertently challenged the martial law, in 
which a very important judgment was passed by CJ Munir: 
[W]here revolution is successful it satisfies the test of efficacy and 
becomes a basic law creating fact. On that assumption the Laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order, however transitory or imperfect, was 
a new legal order and it was in accordance with that order that the 
validity of the laws and the correctness of judicial decisions had to 
be determined.228 
The reasoning behind the Supreme Court decision in this case was the rationale 
put forward by CJ Munir that a '[a] successful coup d'état is an internationally-
recognised legal method of changing a constitution'.229 Although there are no known 
external factors that might have impaired his decision, it is reasonable to assume 
that due to military influence, the judiciary at the time was not quite independent 
enough to overturn or nullify an imposed martial law. 
In other words, this unlawful and unconstitutional act was now made lawful in such 
a way that a single military man could walk in and subvert the will of the people, a 
result which CJ Munir described in his verdict as a 'legalised illegality'.230 
This phase unsurprisingly does not demonstrate the key factors because: 
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1. It lacked the factor of equal representation. This factor did not even exist in 
theory as the country’s federal character was tampered with by changing the 
status of provinces as the country was divided into two provinces East and 
West Pakistan. 
2. There was no separation of powers and there was no check on the central 
government. 
3. The constitution was created according to the choice of the Governor General, 
thus involving the issue of self-interest. It is therefore no surprise that the 
constitution was dissolved within its first two years of implementation in 
1958 following the first martial law regime in Pakistan headed by the Chief 
Martial Administrator General Ayub Khan. 
4.3.3 The Second Constitution (1962 – 1973) 
In 1962, the military government promulgated a new constitution. The 1962 
constitution provided for a so-called presidential system.231 This type of presidential 
system is not to be confused with the comparator US presidential system discussed 
in more depth in Chapter 5 because this despotic political system was unicameral, 
undemocratic and not federal. Although the 1962 constitution abolished the office 
of prime minister and delegated all executive powers to the president, at the same 
time the constitution also stipulated a non-party legislature with limited legislative 
powers.232 
General Ayub Khan appointed himself as president with the powers to dissolve the 
legislature, promulgate legislations and ordinances and most importantly to declare 
an emergency.233 The emergency powers were brought forward from the previous 
constitutional instrument. In addition, the whole constitution was based on General 
Khan's own views about the political system,234 which is substantial evidence of 
self-interest playing a significant role in this phase.  
Not only did this constitution provide for an undemocratic presidential system, but 
it also did not address the issues of disparity. This constitution also provided for a 
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unicameral legislature, with no elected representation whatsoever, which makes it 
even poorer than the previous one. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given General Khan's apparent aims to remain in power 
and govern at his will, this constitution made no provision for separation of powers 
or a system of checks and balances. Although it was disguised as federal, 
democratic and civilian rule, nevertheless, the entire system was in fact an 
authoritarian one that revolved around the personality of General Khan.235 In this 
structure and under this constitution, recourse to the doctrine of state necessity 
was inevitable: the 1962 constitution was suspended, and martial law imposed in 
1969 by General Yahya, although this action was never challenged in or by the 
judiciary. 
The East Pakistan crisis escalated and resulted in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 
which, in its turn, resulted in the secession of East Pakistan. The reason given by 
the government of East Pakistan for its secession was the disparity of representation 
in the design of the earlier constitutions of Pakistan.236 The Awami League party 
from East Pakistan province secured 160 seats in the National Assembly and PPP 
from West Pakistan won 81 seats and yet the leader of the Awami League party was 
barred from taking the office and PPP leader Bhutto was supported for the 
premiership.237 
This evidence speaks for itself that this phase was the most unfortunate with 
respect to the key factors being used for analysis. There was no equal 
representation, no separation of powers, no checks and balance and, above all, the 
constitution was General Khan's own product designed to protect his interests 
rather than serve as a real constitution for the country. The secession was not only 
a necessity but also inevitable. Interestingly, Pakistan itself was created by seceding 
from India so that it could exercise equal representation and freedom from imperial 
rule. 
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4.3.4 The Third Constitution (1973 – Present) 
After the secession of East Pakistan, the new Pakistan adopted a new constitution 
in 1973 under the leadership of Zulfiqar Bhutto. The salient feature of the original 
constitution was that the prime minister was the chief executive. The legislature 
was bicameral and the president (as a ceremonial figurehead) did not have 
emergency powers, in contrast to the position with previous constitutions. Even 
though the legislature was bicameral, the issue of equal representation was not 
entirely addressed, as the upper house was indirectly elected by the provincial 
assemblies. Thus, it failed to demonstrate the key factor of equal representation.  
The division of powers was based on co-ordination as opposed to separation of 
powers principles.238 Although presidential emergency powers were no longer 
specifically granted in the new constitution, yet there were issues of self-interest, as 
Bhutto had established an 'authoritarian government and one man rule, though the 
façade was parliamentary'.239 The researcher observes a similarity between US 
President Trump’s approach towards the government and that with Bhutto. Bhutto 
was, however, a public hero and instituted its first ever democratic parliamentary 
constitution. The similarity, therefore, between his autocracy and that arguably 
exerted by current US President Trump is therefore more superficial than real. 
Bhutto was, further, establishing new, untested, procedures. This autocracy 
nonetheless in the name of civilian rule ended in 1977 through another period of 
martial law instigated by General Zia, who dissolved the government and suspended 
the constitution.240 The Act of General Zia was challenged by Mrs Bhutto in the 
Begum Nusrat Bhutto case.241 
The petition challenged the legality of detention of Mr Bhutto. The petition in this 
case stated that Mr Bhutto and the ten other leaders of the Pakistan People's Party 
were arrested and detained. General Zia made a public statement in which he made 
unfair and incorrect allegations against the Pakistan People's Party Government. 
He indicated his intention of placing the detainees before military tribunals for trial 
to enforce the principle of public accountability. The petition further averred that 
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his action was taken in a mala fide manner with the purpose of preventing the 
Pakistan People's Party from participating in the forthcoming elections.242 
The court admitted the petition and ordered immediate shifting of the detainees 
from Lahore to Rawalpindi. The admission of the petition might have been seen by 
General Zia as a potential threat, therefore he amended the Constitution of 1973.243 
Even prior to the proceedings and the decision in the Nusrat Bhutto case, the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan had not only accorded legitimacy to the martial law 
regime but had also acknowledged and recognized the inherent authority of that 
regime to amend the Constitution.244 Khan was right to observe that the 
reconstituted Supreme Court by virtue of the amendment had ab initio accepted 
the lawful authority of the regime and recognized it as the new legislature.245 
The petition was eventually heard by a nine-judge bench headed by Chief Justice 
Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq. The court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court 
unanimously held that there was a serious political crisis in the country leading to 
a breakdown of the constitutional machinery for which the Constitution provided 
no solution. Not that he was bound to under the principle of stare decisis, but the 
Chief Justice applied the doctrine of necessity and deviated from the immediate 
Asma Jilani case.246 In order to understand the Supreme Court's decision in the 
Nusrat Bhutto case, it is therefore necessary to discuss the Asma Jilani case. 
The order to arrest Malik Jilani in 1971 was challenged in the Lahore High Court 
through a writ petition.247 A day before the issue of the writ petition the order was 
rescinded and substituted by another order of the same day that purported to have 
been issued by the Martial Law Administrator General Yahya Khan. Asma Jilani 
challenged the validity of the order of her father's detention. The petition was 
resisted by the Government and an objection was raised that the High Court had 
no jurisdiction because of the bar contained in the jurisdiction of the Courts Order 
1969 promulgated by the last martial law regime.  
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CJ Rehman ruled that: 
With the utmost respect, therefore, I would agree with the criticism 
that the learned Chief Justice [of LHC] not only misapplied the 
doctrine (of grundnorm) of Hans Kelsen, but also fell into error in 
thinking that it was a generally accepted doctrine of modern 
jurisprudence. Even the disciples of Kelsen have hesitated to go as 
far as Kelsen had gone.  
Grundnorm in the judgment refers to an intrinsic source of law, in this case the 
constitution. The higher and supreme judiciary after CJ Munir's ruling in the Dosso 
case had held that martial law should be accepted by the constitution, as it was a 
successful revolution and the acceptance thereof shows the authority of the 
constitution as the Grundnorm. 
The court in Jilani was pretty scathing about the decision in Dosso. The principle 
enunciated in Dosso’s case, therefore, is wholly unsustainable, and it cannot be 
treated as good law either on the principle of stare decisis or even otherwise. So, it 
is worth making that point (as well as the point about the effect of Jilani on the 
Bhutto case). The court in Bhutto clearly had a decision to make about whether to 
follow Dosso or to follow Jilani and came down in favour of Dosso: 
In the felicitous phrase of my Lord the Chief Justice, the act was more 
in the nature of a “constitutional deviation” rather than an overthrow 
of the Constitution. The Constitution of 1973 is not buried but merely 
suspended. It, however, continues to be the governing instrument 
subject to the provisions of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 
1977. In these circumstances neither the ratio decidendi of Dosso v. 
State nor that of Asma Jillani v. The Punjab Government is strictly 
applicable to the present case.248 
 
In the Asma Jilani case, the Supreme Court also ruled that General Yahya Khan’s 
unconstitutional actions based on the principle of necessity were unsustainable. 
Since the decision of the Supreme Court was promulgated after General Khan had 
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resigned, if he had still been in power, it is argued that, due to military influence, 
there might have been a possibility of a completely different decision. This 
unprecedented overruling could have provided some hope that the use of the 
doctrine of necessity might end. 
As Jilani and Bhutto came to different conclusions, the difference in the results is 
not because of differences in articulation of the principle, but of application to the 
facts. 
To return to the Nusrat Bhutto case, CJ Anwar-ul-Haq justified his application of 
state necessity by saying: 
[T]he Armed Forces of Pakistan, headed by the Chief of Staff of the 
Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq intervened to save 
the country from further chaos and bloodshed, to safeguard its 
integrity and sovereignty, and to separate the warring factions 
which had brought the country to the brink of disaster. It was 
undoubtedly an extra-constitutional step, but obviously dictated by 
the highest consideration of State necessity and welfare of the 
people.249  
He ruled that General Zia was entitled to perform all such acts and promulgate all 
legislative measures as they fell within the scope of the law of necessity, because 
the situation was a temporary “constitutional deviation” and so qualitatively 
different from the previous instances of martial law in Bhutto and Jilani. 
The Court admitting the petition ordered immediate relocation of the detainees. To 
prevent the implementation of these orders, General Zia, who was empowered by 
the Supreme Court, 250 amended the Constitution of 1973.251   
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On the question of influence on the judges in this particular instance, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the judiciary was biased because they were reconstituted 
by General Zia upon a condition known as the Provisional Constitutional Order 
(PCO) that they had accepted ab initio the lawful authority of the regime and 
recognized it as the new legislature.252 The PCO arrangement is clearly the opposite 
of the notion of separation of powers. Notwithstanding the absence of separation of 
powers, the judiciary was no match for the military regime. 
The court dismissed the petition. The Chief Justice (with whom the other members 
of the court agreed) held that there was a serious political crisis in the country 
leading to a breakdown of the constitutional machinery for which the Constitution 
provided no solution. In the Asma Jilani case the court ruled that the necessity was 
unassailable, however, it is argued the court rightly applied the doctrine of necessity 
in the Nusrat Bhutto case.253 
The 1973 constitution was not replaced by another constitution after its suspension 
in 1977 but was reinstated with an amendment through the same PCO. 
The Eighth Amendment 1985: 
Since there were no reforms to the representation issue, nor was there any change 
to the division of powers or accountability by way of checks and balances in the 
1973 constitution, the only positive point in this constitution was the absence of 
absolute powers. 
The PCO gave the martial law regime its legitimacy and also the right to amend the 
constitution.254 The eighth amendment moved executive power from the office of the 
prime minister to the president and introduced the president's discretionary powers 
to dissolve government by General Zia. This development therefore also fails to 
demonstrate the key factors. 
The Thirteenth Amendment 1997: 
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After the assassination of General Zia, Pakistan resumed its civilian government in 
which Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif successively served as prime ministers,255 
although their tenures were prematurely terminated. Neither of the prime ministers 
could serve a full term as they were dismissed by the president invoking Article 
58(2)(B) created by the eighth amendment (i.e. the right to dissolve the assemblies) 
on the basis of constitutional necessity. Thus, for the first time, a procedure for 
premature dissolution was enshrined in the constitution itself. 
Since political governments were struggling to complete their tenure in parliament 
because of the use of presidential emergency powers, in 1997 PM Sharif, through 
the thirteenth amendment, therefore removed the discretionary power of the 
president. 
This development still did not address the issue of equal representation or reform 
the division of powers and consequently it fails to demonstrate the key factors on 
those grounds. This amendment almost reset the constitution to its original draft. 
And, just as the first draft could not deter the military from imposing a period of 
martial law, neither could this amendment. The government was still overthrown 
by General Musharraf in 1999. 
Unsurprisingly the judiciary ratified General Musharraf’s coup d'état in the case of 
Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others vs Gen Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and 
others on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity.256 
On 12 October 1999 General Musharraf suspended the Constitution and dissolved 
the Assemblies. Several petitions challenging the takeover were admitted by the 
Court. Syed Zafar Ali Shah, a member of the ousted National Assembly filed a writ 
petition challenging the validity of the dissolution. The petition was heard by a full 
bench. The Court held that the step taken by General Musharraf was valid as the 
same was motivated by the doctrine of state necessity. 
The court examined the circumstances that preceded the military takeover. The 
court was informed by the Attorney General that the ousted Prime Minister issued 
an illegal order to retire General Musharraf and nominating General Butt as his 
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successor, thereby attempting to create dissension among the armed forces and 
threaten the integrity and sovereignty of the country.  
Khalid Anwar, the Law Minister in the ousted cabinet, argued that the doctrine of 
state necessity had been buried by the British legal system long ago257 and could 
not be resurrected. The Chief Justice did not accept that contention on the premise 
that precedents from foreign jurisprudence, although entitled to reverence and 
respect, were not applicable to the facts and circumstances prevailing on 12 October 
1999.258 
As evident from the discussion of the case law set out above, these decisions have 
served only to encourage the overthrow of governments as they have been used as 
justification. Following the Maulvi Tamizuddin case, every decision save for the 
Asma Jilani case has considered the previous decision and set new precedents 
justifying overthrow in the name of necessity. All of those decisions collectively form 
a collage of justification for acts of premature dissolution in the name of the doctrine 
of state necessity 
The instigator of the practice of premature dissolution of the legislature, Ghulam 
Muhammad, might not himself have been in a position to articulate a justification 
for premature dissolution. Nevertheless, a justification, protecting what would 
otherwise have been an unconstitutional act, was provided for him by the judiciary 
in the shape of the doctrine of necessity.259 In the Maulvi Tammizuddin case, CJ 
Munir not only set a precedent by invoking the doctrine of necessity but also, it is 
argued, introduced, albeit unintentionally, a practice of judicial encouragement of 
such acts of dissolution. Regardless of the allocated duties given to the judicature 
under the constitution,260 it is argued that the supreme judiciary went beyond their 
constitutional powers and remit and encouraged the acts of premature dissolution 
by ratifying those acts under legal principles. It is worth noting that dissolutions of 
legislatures also involved abrogation of constitutions (if one was in place), and under 
                                           
257 There is however no historic evidence of the validity of his assertion. 
258 Fayyaz Hussain and Abdul Khan, 'Role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional and Political 
Development of Pakistan: History and Prospects: Comparative Study of Begum Nusrat Bhutto (1977) 
and Syed Zafar Ali Shah Case (2000)' (2012) 5(2) Journal of Politics and Law 82 
259 Federation of Pakistan and Others vs Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan [1955] PLD 1955, FC 240. 
260 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Part VII. 
65 
 
the current constitution, the same is regarded as high treason, punishable by 
death.261 However, no one has ever been punished for those acts to date. 
Through the seventeenth amendment in 2003, General Musharraf reinvigorated the 
eighth amendment and the discretionary powers were reincarnated for the then 
president. 
In the case of Sindh High Court Bar Association v Federation of Pakistan,262 CJ 
Chaudhry passed a landmark ruling in July 2009 where an emergency declared by 
Musharraf was declared illegal and the court emphasised that the doctrine of 
necessity had, as Khalid Anwar had unsuccessfully argued in 1999, been buried 
forever: 
[N]o such judge shall, hereinafter, offer any support in whatever 
manner to any unconstitutional functionary who acquires power 
otherwise than through the modes envisaged by the constitution.263  
Although the application of a doctrine of necessity was categorically rejected in the 
July 2009 ruling by the Supreme Court, it had in fact already been rejected in April 
1972 in the Asma Jilani case, but it did not stop Musharraf from overthrowing 
Nawaz Sharif's government in 1999.  
The Eighteenth Amendment 2010: 
Once again, the president's discretionary powers were repealed by an amendment 
to the constitution.264 The 18th Amendment was made with the intention to develop 
the relationship between the provincial and federal government as well as relations 
among provinces.265 It is argued that the 18th Amendment may not be as productive 
an innovation as it may have been intended, as it does not provide anything new. 
This amendment removes the presidential discretionary power of dissolving the 
legislature, nevertheless, it does not prevent military takeovers. For example, the 
                                           
261 ibid Art 6. 
262 PLD (2009) SC 879. 
263 ibid. 
264 The Constitution of Pakistan (of 1973), 18th Amendment. 
265 Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, see also Katharine Adeney, 'A Step Towards 
Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics of the 18th Amendment' (2012) 42(4) Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 539. 
66 
 
1999 overthrow of the legislature was a result of a coup d'état, not an exercise of 
presidential discretionary powers. 
This constitutional development still does not address the issue of disparity of 
representation.266 As suggested in Chapter 3, federation can only be strong if the 
units forming it are strong, which is only possible by recognising the federal rights 
of all units,267 not only one province. The most important federal right is two-
dimensional equal representation. The supremacy of Punjab is a great hurdle which 
must be overcome to achieve equal representation. The constitutional reforms of 
2009 might have been a viable reform towards improving representation and intra 
federating unit tensions had Punjab's supremacy been revised by, for example, 
creation of new provinces.268  
Adeney, in her analysis of the recent constitutional development, the 18th 
Amendment.269 covers some of the aspects which are relevant to equal 
representation in Pakistan, and her analysis covers economic grievances and 
secessionist movements. She supports the idea that there is a problem of disparity 
of representation, albeit by reference to groups rather than to provinces. She notes 
that: 
[T]he issues of delivery and responsive government are important to 
the inclusion of all groups, many of who have been alienated from 
the state by the current political system, of which the federal design 
is an important part.270 
Although Adeney does not herself propose any solution to the problem of disparity, 
she believes that stronger federation is established by stronger federal units 
(provinces) by recognising their federal rights.271 Adeney claims that recognition of 
diversity can be a source of strength and she gives the example of India where 
diversity may have played an important role in federal strength. Adeney’s conclusion 
is significant, however, in the context of this project, India is not a useful example. 
India may not have problems of premature dissolutions of legislature arising from 
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disparity of representation, but there is evidence of other diversity related problems 
leading to secession movements and riots, for example separatist actions in 
Kashmir, the Khalistan movement in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s and another 
insurgency in Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland.272 
Pakistan is a centralized majoritarian federation comprising a core ethnic region 
and a small number of units.  Adeney is, it is suggested, correct in concluding that 
the design of this federation has caused increased disaffection with the centre and 
the core group—Punjabis.273 The dominance of the Punjab after the secession of 
East Pakistan in 1971 has caused many tensions and the Special Parliamentary 
Commission on Constitutional Reforms 2009 was a productive initiative designed 
to settle those tensions but was not utilized properly as the supremacy of Punjab 
was maintained.274 The issue of unequal representation, amongst other 
repercussions, also led to the continuous struggle of creating new provinces.275 
There is nothing inherently objectionable in the creation of new provinces. However, 
it is likely that, without other structural changes, such developments will be 
opposed by the one province that has an effective majority.276 
Creation of new provinces may improve to some extent the problem of seat allocation 
so that ultimately Punjab's supremacy can be ended. Creation of new provinces will 
require parliamentary assent and it is highly unlikely that such assent can be 
obtained when Punjab has the majority representation in parliament.277 
Adeney has also observed that politicians have realised that deals with the military 
to overthrow governments 'backfire in the long term'.278 She is referring to military 
intervention in overthrowing the government by way of for example military coups. 
Adeney recognizes the existence of secessionist movements but suggests that 
Pakistan is not in danger of disintegration because of the strong military.279 There 
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is, however, it is argued, nevertheless a continued danger of disintegration in some 
respect, despite Adeney’s justified rationale that a stronger military presence 
substantially reduces the likelihood of that risk occurring, because a stronger 
military prevents secessions, by overthrowing the government (in the name of state 
necessity). 
In 2013, the PML(N) and in 2018, the PTI achieved an absolute majority and formed 
a government as they won the majority of seats in Punjab. There have been 
allegations of election rigging at both instances, especially in the 2013 elections 
which initiated several protests in Pakistan in an attempt to have the government 
dissolved.280  
This phase has repeatedly failed to demonstrate the key factors and it is reasonable 
to deduce that the country has not progressed towards any positive reforms to 
address the issue of representation or improve the separation of powers. The phase 
is full of examples of episodes of self-interest: 
1. There were no reforms to address the issue of disparity. It lacked the factor of 
equal representation. 
2. There were no instruments creating a separation of powers or a checks and 
balances system. 
3. There were elements of self-interest initially in favour of the Prime Minister, 
then of presidents. 
4.3.5 Summary of the Test Results 
As a legal realist and given the political volatility of the circumstances in which the 
cases were, by definition, brought, the researcher was alert to the possibility of 
external influence on the judges that strained their reasoning. Examination of the 
legal reasoning in the cases does not of itself betray any such influences.  
Nevertheless, the possibility that members of the judiciary were concerned for their 
futures can perhaps be inferred. The difficult relationship between the judiciary and 
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the government in Pakistan has not only been demonstrated in the attempt by the 
president in 2007 to suspend the Chief Justice (and subsequent international 
outcry) but more recently in the 2017 Supreme Court disqualification of Prime 
Minister Sharif. 
The table below summarises the past events of premature dissolution. 
Table 1- Summary of Acts of Dissolution 
Date Dissolved by Ratified/Overturned by 
24 October 1954 
Ghulam Muhammad 
(Governor General) 
CJ Munir (relied on 
necessity) – Ratified 
07 October 1958 Iskandar Mirza (President) 
CJ Munir (relied on 
necessity) – Ratified 
05 July 1977 Zia Ul Haq (Army Chief) 
CJ Anwar-ul-Haq (relied on 
necessity) – Ratified 
06 August 1990 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
(President) 
Unchallenged 
18 April 1993 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
(President) 
CJ Nasim Hassan Shah – 
Overturned 
05 November 1996 
Farooq Ahmad Khan Laghari 
(President) 
Unchallenged 
12 October 1999 Pervez Musharraf (Army Chief) 
CJ Ahmed (relied on 
necessity) – Ratified 
 
Pakistan has, as indicated above, been suffering from political instability whereby 
its political growth and democratic progression have been diminished by 
intervention by military chiefs or presidents – warranted or unwarranted – in 
parliament achieving its full term.  
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There have been adjustments to the constitution which both provide for, and 
remove, the president’s discretionary powers to dissolve assemblies (even before 
their term). Those discretionary powers are under Article 58 of the current 
constitution.281 Although presidents have used the plea of necessity to justify their 
actions, the doctrine of state necessity has also been routinely invoked in the case 
of military takeover.  
Premature dissolutions are also ratified by the judiciary in the name of the 
application of the doctrine of necessity. There are several landmark cases in the 
history of Pakistan that have supported acts of premature dissolution even to the 
extent of justifying martial law and abrogation of the constitution.  
The analysis in this chapter has identified that the key factors selected are not 
incorporated not only in Pakistan's present political system but also all in all those 
of the past. The pattern shown in the preceding analysis answers the first subsidiary 
research question in the affirmative. In answering the second sub-question, this 
analysis has also established that despite being branded as a democratic federation, 
Pakistan does not incorporate the selected key factors that are present, specifically, 
in the US model. 
Table 2 - Summary of Results 
 1935-1954 1956-1962 1962-1973 1973-2018 
Compliant with equal 
representation? 
✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ 
Provide for separation of 
powers and checks and 
balances? 
✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ 
Are there elements of self-
interest? 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
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An important and unprecedented event occurred in the year 2008, when none of 
the parties had an absolute majority and, consequently, a coalition government had 
to be formed.282 Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML(N)) was an influential party 
in Punjab and the Pakistan People Party (PPP) has a large vote bank in the Sindh 
province, consequently the parliament of 2008-13 was formed by way of coalition of 
the PPP and PML(N) and other smaller parties. It is worth noting that it was also 
unprecedented that the parliament was not dissolved prematurely during this time. 
This unprecedented completion of the parliamentary term sheds light on the 
research question "Is there any connection between premature dissolution of 
government and one party having an absolute majority?" Of course, there may be 
many more reasons for the parliament completing its full term without premature 
dissolution, such as the country's democratic maturity, educational awareness and 
end of the most recent military regime. However, it cannot be ignored that a 
plausible and logical possibility was the parliamentary arrangements which served 
as a deterrent to disparity of representation283 and inadvertently formed a checks 
and balances system. The parliament of 2008-13 was in fact somewhat compliant 
with the ideals of the model democratic federal political arrangement, and this 
essentially prevented any further instances of premature dissolution to date.284 
The coalition government inadvertently manifested the factor of equal 
representation alongside a checks and balances system which also hinted at the 
separation of powers to let the parliament complete its full term for the first time. 
The hypothesis that Pakistan is not operating a suitable political system cannot be 
conclusive without comparing it with a suitable political system. As indicated in 
Chapter 1, a suitable political system for a democratic federal state is a Democratic 
Federal Political System, which strictly incorporates the factors used in the 
preceding analysis.  
Potential causes of premature dissolution in Pakistan have been narrowed down for 
the purposes of this thesis to key driving factors, i.e. the absence of a range of key 
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democratic or federal factors in the political system. These factors lead to risk to the 
country's integrity as a union, and in any case, cases in which necessity is invoked, 
rightly or wrongly, arise and these consequently justify the premature dissolution. 
In the next chapter, these factors are explored in more detail as part of the 
comparative analysis.  
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5. A Comparative law inquiry into the USA and Pakistan 
Constitutional Systems 
This chapter uses comparative law techniques to compare Pakistan and the USA in 
terms of their state structures and political systems. 
As indicated in 2.6, a structural approach is initially used in section 5.1, to explore 
the similarity between the two states' structure. This is a pre-requisite for any 
further comparative analysis. A functional-institutional approach is used thereafter 
to highlight the issues arising due to dissimilarity and through a problem solving 
approach to propose a solution and implementation in Chapter 6. 
A functional-institutional approach is used in the remaining sections of this chapter 
to conduct a like by like comparison.  
5.1 The State Structure Analysis 
The purpose of this structural comparison is to ascertain whether the state 
structure of Pakistan is compatible with a US style presidential system. According 
to the researcher's hypothesis of constitutional suitability, a Democratic Federal 
Political System is appropriate for a democratic federal state. The working 
assumption is that both the USA and Pakistan are democratic federal states, 
therefore, similarities between their state structure should be prominent. This 
section ascertains these similarities. The parameters of comparison are mainly in 
the two states’ historical origin and their political arrangements. 
It is logical to suggest that the way in which the political system functions for the 
USA should function for Pakistan if their state structures have some similarity. 
5.1.1 The USA 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the ideals of the Enlightenment were the basis for the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.285 The framers of the US 
constitution were, for example, inspired by the theories of government of Locke, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau.286  
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The US constitution is over two centuries old, which is a reasonable age from which 
to infer its reliability. The institutions in the USA have developed through the 
acumen of its founding fathers influenced by Enlightenment philosophers. The US 
political system has evolved by addressing several issues discussed later in this 
Chapter. The US political system is a 'constantly dynamic system of unrelenting 
process of trial and error'.287 
There are two aspects to be considered in order to fully ascertain the similarity 
between both the state structures of both countries, i.e., their historic origin and 
their political composition. The comparison in this section will therefore take into 
account the composition of the original union (comprising 13 colonies) of the USA 
and the five provinces of Pakistan. 
The original colonies of America were Crown Colonies (ruled by a Governor, who 
was assisted by a Council), Proprietary Colonies (which were under individuals 
given the powers of government) and the Charter colonies (in which the government 
powers were conferred directly upon the common people). 
In colonial times, the American colonies had already implemented self-government, 
and, through elected assemblies, had the right to legislate. The powers of the 
colonies in America included trade, policing and taxation.288 The British Empire had 
control over other powers such as the military and foreign affairs. There was a 
perpetual struggle of self-governance between the colonists and the representatives 
of the empire, which eventually led to a war between the American colonies and the 
Empire.289 The Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776 declared that the 
colonies were free and independent states.  
The colonies were not only independent of the Crown but also independent of one 
another.290 In June 1776 a committee was commissioned to draft the articles for 
confederation, which were ratified by the then Congress on 15 November 1777.291 
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These articles of confederation were merely conventions with no binding 
authority.292 
The early Congress consisted of the delegates of the states and each state had one 
vote.293 The Congress was designed to control the states' affairs but essentially 
lacked any real authority or force.294 
After the War of Independence was over, there were some inter-state disputes.295 
These gave rise to the Annapolis convention in September 1786 which met to 
consider the extension of the power of the then union known as Confederation.296 
Only five states responded to the conference.297 Alexander Hamilton from New York 
moved to summon a convention of delegates of all the States to consider the 
question of amending the Articles, which resulted in the famous Convention at 
Philadelphia in 1787.298  
The convention delegates approached the issue by determining that they had two 
objectives before them, i.e. to establish a stable central government and to preserve 
the independence of the States.299 This resulted in a document incorporating the 
constitution of the new government of the United States in force on 4th March 
1789.300 
This constitution substantially changed the fate of the then 13 states, because it 
created a government that was designed to establish stronger federating units and 
a weak central government,301 which suggests quite a satisfactory arrangement for 
union or confederation since their individual identity and autonomy was preserved. 
Perhaps it was this federal character that allowed the number of states to rise from 
the original 13 to 50, thus making the USA a union of 50 states. 
                                           
292 ibid. 
293 ibid. 
294 ibid. 
295 For example the issue of navigation of the river Potomac between Maryland and Virginia, see 
generally Mount Vernon Conference: James Charleton et al, 'Framers of the Constitution' (1986) 
Washington, National Archives and Records Administration 19. 
296 ibid. 
297 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia. 
298 James Charleton et al, 'Framers of the Constitution' (1986) Washington, National Archives and 
Records Administration. 
299 ibid. 
300 ibid. 
301 Francis Newton Thorpe, 'History of the American People' (1901) World Constitutions Illustrated 
56. 
76 
 
This section only focuses on the initial 13 colonies or states for a comparative 
analysis with Pakistan's initial five provinces. From the point of practicality, it is 
wise first to explore how the initial 13 states formed a union and surrendered their 
sovereignty and to consider such issues as whether they were actually similar in 
certain respects or had common goals. The initial 13 colonies were situated on the 
Atlantic coast of North America. In early US history there were disputes between 
these states and those that had joined the union later.302 
These colonies were classified into three groups i.e. the New England colonies, the 
Middle colonies and the Southern colonies.303 Each group had a different socio-
economic, political and religious character.304 
The economic activities of these colonies were primarily reliant on their location, for 
example; the northern colonies of New England were mainly involved in 
manufacture and industries such as ship building, the southern colonies focused 
on agriculture and livestock and the middle colonies alongside agriculture also 
concentrated on manufacturing metallurgic products such as tools, blocks of iron 
etc.305 
In summary, the 13 colonies, which were essentially different in important aspects, 
(i.e. socio-economic, political and religious) managed to compromise and 
surrendered their sovereignty to form a union. Despite certain longstanding political 
issues, such as civil war, and secession attempts for reasons other than 
representation or anarchy, their history over the past two centuries has witnessed 
that the arrangement has proved itself and the union has survived.  
It is argued that had similar arrangements been considered for the initial five 
provinces in newly formed Pakistan, Pakistan would have been stable since those 
five provinces at least shared some common values.306 In the next section, the 
inception of Pakistan is explored; compared to that of the USA and its deviation 
from the US model is tracked in subsequent sections. 
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5.1.2 Pakistan 
Chapter 4 set out the constitutional, historical and political background of 
Pakistan’s history in detail.  This section, however, focuses on those aspects of that 
background that are particularly relevant for the structural comparison with the 
USA.  
Pakistan (the then subcontinent), was part of a British Colony somewhat similar to 
the USA save that in this arrangement the British introduced a system of devolution 
of powers where the interest of the Empire was pre-eminent.307 The British colonised 
India and three independent presidencies were set up subordinated to the Governor 
General.308 The Governor General was assisted by a council called the executive 
council.309 The presidencies were later given the status of provinces or dominions 
and given certain administrative and legislative powers.310 A judiciary was also 
constituted to interpret law.311 The central government had overriding powers and 
therefore the polity was not of a democratic federal nature as it compromised on the 
point of equal representation of people (first dimensional representation) and 
dominions (second dimensional representation).312  
The three presidencies model set up by the Empire has its similarity with the earlier 
colonies of America, i.e., Crown Colonies, Proprietary Colonies and the Charter 
colonies.313 
At the time of the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan could be classified into 
three groups; i.e. one group comprised of 13 princely states along with parts of 
Kashmir; the second group consisted of East Bengal and the third group comprised 
of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP present day KP), West Punjab Sindh and 
Baluchistan. 
                                           
307 Asok Chanda, Federalism in India (London: George Allen & Unwin 1965). 
308 Lucy Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics (The Clarendon Press 
1952). 
309 For example Regulatory Act 1784, 1793, 1833, 1853. 
310 Asok Chanda, Federalism in India (London: George Allen & Unwin 1965). 
311 ibid. 
312 Lucy Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics (The Clarendon Press 
1952). 
313 Vishnoo Bhagwan & Vidya Bhushan, World Constitution - A Comparative Study (Sterling 
Publishers 1998) 2. 
78 
 
Apart from sharing the same religion, the federating units of Pakistan did not and 
still do not share culture, language or traditions.314 Besides independence from the 
British Empire, these three groups of India wanted a separate Muslim country free 
from India. These three groups comprised the majority Muslim population. Pakistan 
is at an advantage here since religion plays an important role in people's daily life. 
The involvement of religion will be explored further in the functional comparison in 
the subsequent sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
A federal arrangement would have provided greater autonomy to all units. Even in 
the current arrangement where four provinces now exist, these still have indigenous 
differences of culture, language, traditions and values. Under such circumstances, 
allowing one province to decide the fate of others is problematic. 
It is not suggested in the case of the USA, that the heterogeneity of religion or 
possibly the consciousness of the heterogeneity, created a stronger unit. In fact, the 
argument is more in favour of a federal arrangement which could drive a group of 
heterogeneous states to form a strong union.  In the case of Pakistan, federalism 
would have made an even stronger union due to the component states’ connection 
through a common belief, i.e., religion. 
In conclusion, there are some similarities in the initial situation of the two countries.  
Both had been British colonies and both experienced turbulence at the time of 
independence. Both consisted of groups of subsidiary states without significant 
consistency in culture or tradition. Nevertheless, the US model with its emphasis 
on equal representation has continued without change or challenge in a relatively 
peaceful political situation in a way that Pakistan’s model, with the addition of the 
potentially unifying power of a shared religion, but without the security of equal 
representation, has not. Although other factors may be at play, the next section 
goes on to consider the extent to which the key political structures relating to the 
key factors might contribute to this difference.  
5.2 Government Structure – Legislative & Executive 
In this section a functional-institutional comparison is carried out to determine how 
the three branches of government are linked, constituted and operate. 
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According to Locke, consent plays a central role and is the mechanism by which 
political societies are created.315 The case of Pakistan may be considered as a 
practical implementation of the effect when a federal government fails to perform its 
basic duty i.e. absence of key factors, which then raises the issue of consent or will 
of the people and ultimately causes governments to be overthrown.316 
Locke may well be construed as a reluctant democrat as his theory of consent 
focuses on the issue that a few people actually consent to their governments, so no 
governments are actually legitimate.317 The government formed by Pakistan if only 
involves majority from one province is not actually a legitimate government in 
Locke's sense. 
Montesquieu goes further in his three classifications of governments: republican 
governments, monarchies and despotisms.318 The form that is relevant for this 
thesis is republican which is further classified into democratic and aristocratic.319 
As discussed above in Chapter 4, although Pakistan espouses a democratic model, 
in fact, because of the prevalence of military coups, and the readiness of the 
judiciary to retrospectively validate those coups, the model is at least at times, 
despotic. Pakistan is a republican democratic state at least in theory, and in practice 
it does adopt the shape of despotism at times of military rule. This clash between 
the ostensibly democratic but in fact despotic, as shown through the examples in 
Chapter 4, is at the very heart of the problem in this thesis. 
Montesquieu, being a medium democrat, believes that the people are sovereign and 
govern through chosen representatives.320 In the case of Pakistani politics, self-
interests is also one of the issues indicated in Chapter 4, where representatives 
influence the law to suit their agenda. The researcher argues that the democracy of 
Pakistan is corrupted due to what Montesquieu calls the spirit of inequality,321 
where politicians put their self-interests before the interests of the state.322 The 
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researcher claims that the will of the people also encourages the overthrow of 
governments due to disparity of representation, for example all three martial law 
regimes had the support of the majority of the people at least in the beginning.  The 
practice of premature dissolution is nurtured because these acts are not only 
supported by the judiciary in the name of necessity but also welcomed by the 
people.323 
Unlike Montesquieu, Rousseau takes a more extreme stance towards government, 
which is inline with the two dimensional representation. Rousseau advocates that 
individuals should be assumed to have entered into a social contract where they 
would give up all their rights to the whole community which, like Hobbes, he refers 
to as a sovereign.324 They then exercise their general will to legislate for the public 
good. 
Rousseau's central doctrine in politics is that a state can be legitimate only if it is 
guided by the general will of its members.325 Unlike other Enlightenment 
philosophers such as Locke and Montesquieu who developed theories of government 
that had a deep effect on the American revolution,326 Rousseau's political 
philosophy has extreme democratic views, especially those of the doctrine of 
sovereignty and representation, with his apparent rejection of representative 
government.327 He believed that the legislature would need to legislate only on the 
areas or issues upon which citizens had not specifically agreed.328 His hostility to 
the representation of sovereignty extends to the election of representatives to 
sovereign assemblies even where those representatives are subject to periodic re-
election.329  
All three philosophers advocated the concept of representation albeit using different 
terminologies but conveying the same essence of equal representation. According to 
Locke, governments exist by the consent of the people and when they fail to perform 
their basic duty should be resisted and overthrown. This assertion is reflected in 
                                           
323 The researcher has personal knowledge that the people of Pakistan have supported martial law at 
least in the beginning. 
324 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Christopher Betts tr, Oxford University Press 1994). 
325 ibid. 
326 Armando Navarro, The Cristal Experiment: A Chicano Struggle for Community Control (University of 
Wisconsin Press 1998). 
327 ibid. 
328 ibid. 
329 ibid. 
81 
 
the US Bill of Rights.330 According to Montesquieu, people are sovereign and govern 
through chosen representatives. In relation to Rousseau, the state can be legitimate 
if it is guided by the general will of its members. In the next two subsections, the 
two countries are explored under the philosophical lens as discussed in this section. 
5.2.1 The USA 
The US government is composed of three branches. Each of these is given powers 
over the others to guarantee that there are checks and balances.331 The legislative 
branch i.e. Congress has two houses, and the composition of these houses ensures 
equal representation at both federal and states' level. These three branches function 
independently of each other. 
People invested with power are highly likely to abuse it and therefore those powers 
must be limited.332 As discussed in 3.3, separation of the executive, legislative and 
judicial powers of government improves the issue of the abuse of powers by 
individual branches and checks and balances operate effectively. In practice, the 
concept of separation of powers can also be noticed within the legislative branch 
where both houses are balanced in sense of their exclusive and overlapping roles. 
The current model of the USA provides for a bicameral legislature.333 Its lower house 
is called the House of Representatives (with 435 members) and the upper house the 
Senate (with 100 members). Unlike many other democracies such as the UK, India 
or Pakistan, the upper House of the USA is more powerful than the lower house, for 
example, the US Senate can also operate as executive and judiciary.334 These 
additional powers are not indicative that the separation of powers is compromised 
because these powers can only be used in special circumstances, for example, 
impeachment which is a judicial process but can only be conducted by the Senate 
sitting as jury. 
The tenure of the lower house is two years, and that of the Senate is six years. To 
the researcher, the two year tenure is a more democratic and productive 
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arrangement, for many reasons, for example: it improves awareness in voters of the 
need to choose the right candidate and accountability and performance of the 
congressmen improve if they want to be re-elected in two years’ time. A five year 
tenure on the other hand is a long time to revisit voters' choice of candidate. If a 
similar tenure of the national assembly were to be adopted by Pakistan, it might 
temporarily address the issue of premature dissolution since the historic premature 
dissolutions had been of parliaments that had completed at least two years of their 
tenure. Nevertheless, such an interim measure may not address the actual problem 
of disparity. 
The current model of the US political system incorporates equal representation in 
the two-dimensional paradigm described in 3.2. The arrangement ensures that the 
member states regardless of their size and population have an equal representation 
in the federation. 
The framers of the constitution have appropriated an important place to the upper 
house. It is even mentioned earlier than the House of Representatives in the 
constitution.335 The US Senate has an inviolable role in the federalism and 
democracy of the USA, it is the assurance of the autonomy of the states before 
forming a union. Allocation of equal number of senators from each state has 
ensured the states' right of equal representation in the second dimension. Although 
there have nevertheless been secession attempts in the US in the past, none of those 
have, to date, succeeded.336 It is important to note, that these secession attempts 
were not due to an issue of representation. 
The reasoning behind the use of bicameralism is straightforward. The initial 
unicameral legislature of the Congress under the Articles of the Confederation 
between 1781 and 1787 was weak and smaller states were struggling to ensure 
their equality since their sovereignty would have been threatened if representation 
was merely based on population.337 
It is very important to note that the upper house under the original US Constitution 
is not a directly elected house, but rather chosen by the states' legislatures.338 This 
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arrangement has great similarity with Pakistan's current procedure for the election 
of senators, who are chosen by the provincial assemblies. 
In the case of the USA, there are two possible reasons why the framers of the US 
constitution made this early arrangement for indirect election of the Senate,339 that 
is, their conclusion that the advantages of indirect election outweighed the 
disadvantages of direct election. They were concerned about the candidates being 
able to manipulate the voters and win the polls, whereas letting a group of people 
with much more experience in states' affairs choose the senators would be 
beneficial.340 Indirect election was also seen as a mechanism to ensure harmony 
between the state legislatures and central government.341 
The USA had similar issues of self-interest with indirect elections of senators to 
those observed in Pakistan. There were problems such as secret deals, with the 
result that financial power could potentially place senators in the Senate.342 There 
were even times that the states' legislatures failed to elect a senator, for example 
until 1912 on several occasions several states were represented by only one member 
in the Senate.343 Between 1901 and 1903, there was no representation for the state 
of Delaware in the Senate.344 Wealthy people at the time could literally buy the votes 
required to get them in the Senate.345 Due to the increasing unpopularity of the 
practice of indirect election, the 17th Amendment in 1912 abolished the indirect 
election and provided for direct popular election. 
Pakistan faces similar issues of corruption in the election of the upper house. The 
USA's solution to this problem is to elect its members directly.  
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As much as bicameralism is efficiently implanted in the US political system, which 
guarantees equal representation of states and its people, nonetheless, this concept 
is not fully observed in the process for a presidential election. 
Under the US constitution, the head of state and head of government are the same 
person, the president. In other parliamentary democracies, the head of state, for 
instance the president in Pakistan and India or the monarch in the UK, has very 
limited operational power. By contrast, the US president is powerful as he is at the 
same time head of government. His office can be compared with those of prime 
ministers of other parliamentary democracies such as the UK or Pakistan. However, 
it is argued, even when he is compared with prime ministers, he still enjoys 
enormous powers.346 It would not be exaggerating to state that the US president's 
office has had the most power among its equivalents in other democratic nations.347 
It is under the US political system that the constitution has made the president an 
executive head. It is difficult to compare the US president’s position and/or his office 
with any other foreign institution.348 As Laski puts it, '[he] is both more and less 
than a king, he is also both more and less than a Prime Minister'.349 
Theoretically the US president is elected through an indirect election.350 The 
'indirect' factor is due to the selection process by the Electoral College, which is 
directly elected by the people.351 The Electoral College is constituted of 538 
members.352 Each state has its presidential electors, and the allocation is based on 
the similar principle as that of Congress.353 This researcher does not agree with the 
method of using an Electoral College as this thesis strongly advocates direct 
representation of the people as discussed in 3.2. The Electoral College appears to 
be an extra and unnecessary layer of formality in the presidential election process, 
since the people elect presidential electors and then they cast their vote for president 
and vice president, the people should be able to elect the president directly instead. 
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The researcher's Democratic Federal Political System does not have any room for 
indirect election and it is on this point that even the US political system deviates 
(albeit slightly) from it. It is not only the researcher's contention that there is a flaw 
in the use of the Electoral College, but there have been in the past proposals to 
abolish the Electoral College.  
The American Bar Association in 1967 recommended that the Electoral College to 
be substituted by a popular vote. This recommendation was passed by the lower 
house but failed in the upper house.354 Later, in 1977, President Jimmy Carter was 
also unsuccessful in his attempt to propose a direct presidential election.355 The 
researcher fully agrees with each charge put by the American Bar Association that 
'[t]he electoral college method of electing a President of the United States is archaic, 
undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous'.356  
It is however conceded that equal representation is implemented in accordance with 
the Democratic Federal Political System in both houses in the US congress, but at 
the same time, it is argued, the presidential election system reveals some degree of 
unbalance. Representation and the will of the people are important principles,357 
and it is illogical to conduct a presidential election indirectly through an Electoral 
College. It diminishes the will of the people, for example, in the most recent US 
Presidential Elections (2016), the runner up candidate had 48.2% of the popular 
vote, whereas the elected president had only 46.2% of the popular vote.358 
In the next section, the government structure of Pakistan will be described and then 
compared to that of the USA in terms of legislature and executive. 
5.2.2 Pakistan 
Unlike the USA where the three branches of government are separated, in the case 
of Pakistan, the powers are co-ordinated between the three branches, which 
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primarily means that these branches are not independent of each other, but 
interdependent.359 The executive branch as in the UK is created from the legislative 
branch. The judiciary on the other hand has some level of theoretical independence. 
The Parliament is comprised of two houses like the US Congress and its composition 
is extremely similar to the earlier US congress where the upper house was elected 
by the state legislature. There is an office of the President, who is elected by the 
parliament and is merely a ceremonial figurehead. Parliamentary seats are allocated 
by way of proportional representation. 
Seat allocation on the basis of population proportionality is pragmatic and logical 
and the arrangement is similar to that of the US House of Representatives. The 
issue arises when the constitution allows one federating unit to form a government 
for the rest of the union. Under the US political system, one or some states cannot 
control the fate of other states, there are safeguards to prevent any such eventuality. 
For instance, direct elections of state senators, representatives and the separate 
election of the president are three distinct powers in a triangular relationship. It is 
theoretically possible under the US political system to have one party in the majority 
in the lower house, a second party in the majority in the upper house and a 
president belonging to a third party. This clearly indicates that it is not possible for 
one state in the USA to monopolise government for the rest of the union. 
In theory the Senate of Pakistan, like that of the USA, is composed with the aim of 
giving equal representation to all the federating units in order to promote national 
unity and maintain coordination. The tenure of its members is set in a similar way 
to the USA, that is six years, and half of its members are required to retire every 
three years. Like the early US Senate, Pakistan's senators are indirectly elected by 
the legislatures of the federating units. This method of indirect election was 
abandoned by the USA following the 17th amendment to the constitution. It is 
argued that the reasons for the USA abandoning the indirect method are equally 
applicable to Pakistan, in pursuit of more transparent representation of the 
federating units. 
The Constitution established the upper house for a reason, which is to preserve 
equal representation in the federation primarily because the popularly elected lower 
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house of parliament is dominated by Punjab province which is more than half of 
Pakistan's population.360 
The problem of disparity is particularly acute in Pakistan because there is not only 
a disparity of representation in the lower house, but it which translates into 
disparity in the upper house that is meant to represent provinces equally. It is 
argued, indeed, that federating units in Pakistan are unable to obtain two 
dimensional representation as the selection of senators is by indirect election and 
senators do not play any role in forming a government which is the prerogative of 
the lower house only. It is also a common practice to secure a seat by using financial 
or other political influence. This is also known as 'political-horse trading'.361 
Comparing this with the US triangle of lower house, upper house and executive 
head, Pakistan's upper house is ineffective because senators do not reflect the true 
representation in the second dimension due to their indirect election. The lower 
house and upper house both can therefore be, and usually are, controlled by one 
province or the party that wins in that province. 
With the upper house ineffective in terms of representing the provinces, it would 
not be exaggerating to simply conclude that Pakistan's political system is a de facto 
unitary government.  
The USA and Pakistan clearly are, therefore, different in their political systems. The 
USA is a federation with a presidential form of government, which conforms, to a 
greater extent, to the factors of democratic federalism selected for use in this thesis. 
The US Congress is entirely different from its colonial predecessor (the UK) whereas 
Pakistan has eventually adopted more of a Westminster model where the upper 
house has a completely different function. 
In Pakistan, the parliament controls the executive, which is composed of the leader 
of the majority party and his cabinet (ministers). The USA, on the other hand, has 
Congress and the President unconnected to each other. Congress cannot remove 
the secretaries nor are secretaries present in Congress to answer any questions 
from either of the houses. The prime minister of Pakistan can get the National 
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Assembly dissolved by advising the president, but the US President cannot dissolve 
Congress before the end of its term.  
Pakistan has been under the dictatorship of military rulers for more than half of its 
existence as a country. However, the current political system, albeit branded as 
democratic, is also dictatorial, as the prime minister and his cabinet can take 
decisions without any checks from other bodies such as the judiciary. The US 
Congress has more operative control over the cabinet than the Parliament of 
Pakistan has over the cabinet. Cabinet is part of the Parliament under Pakistan's 
political system, but the US cabinet is not part of Congress. 
In conclusion, the political system of Pakistan does not fulfil the concept of equal 
representation in the second dimension and the doctrine of separation of powers is 
not manifested in its parliamentary arrangement. The US political system on the 
other hand, has found and implemented a solution to uphold equality of 
representation in the second dimension i.e. federating units. 
The next section goes on to consider the judiciary, which is the third element of 
government structure and is clearly significant as the custodian of the constitution 
and guardian of democracy. 
5.3 Government Structure – The Judiciary 
The judicial system and its functioning in any polity varies with respect to its 
political system. 
5.3.1 The USA 
There was, however, no provision for a judicature under the Articles of 
Confederation in the USA.362 At the Philadelphia Convention, the need for a central 
judiciary was ascertained not only to address the issues of confederation but also 
to provide rulings regarding conflicting decisions between states.363 Consequently, 
the subsequent US constitution provided that 'The judicial power of the United 
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States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish'.364  
The Supreme Court is created by the constitution, whereas other all other federal 
courts are created by Congress.365 The Supreme Court plays a very significant role 
in the US judicial system. All the judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the 
President himself, upon the advice or recommendation of the Senate.366 The 
appointment of judges (judiciary) are by the president (executive) with the 
involvement of Senate (legislature). This process should not be seen as 
circumventing the separation of powers, for two reasons. First, Supreme Court 
judges are appointed for life and cannot be removed by either executive or 
legislature save for impeachment. Second, the President can only appoint judges on 
the advice and recommendations of the Senate which is likely to be comprised of a 
mixture of all parties, unlike the parliamentary house in Pakistan.367 If the Senate 
wishes to oppose any nomination by the president they can and have done. For 
example, President Obama nominated Merrick Garland for Associate Justice of 
Supreme Court, whom the Senate successfully opposed by holding their vote for 
293 days until the presidential term had expired.368 
Whilst the Supreme Court of the USA has several judicial functions, in the context 
of this thesis, the significant role of the Supreme Court is that of custodian of the 
constitution and protector of the federation and of democracy. 
The Supreme Court is the guardian of the US Constitution because, by way of 
judicial review, it can nullify any unconstitutional laws passed by the Congress or 
by executive order by the President. The case of Marbury v Madison369 is a good 
example that demonstrates the power of judicial review. The facts of this case have 
some similarity with the previous example of Obama nominating Merrick Garland 
for Supreme Court near the end of his presidential term except that in this case 
President John Adams had already appointed William Marbury as Justice of the 
Peace for the District of Columbia. When President Jefferson succeeded, he ordered 
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his secretary of state not to finalize the appointment of Marbury. The Supreme 
Court nullified the presidential order of Adams and by extension ruled against 
Marbury. 
The judicial review power vested in the US political system has not only guarded 
the constitution from being abused but also provided a substantial shield against 
any despotic intention of the executive or the military,370 unlike in the case of 
Pakistan, where unconstitutional acts have been ratified by the Supreme Court. The 
US Supreme Court has played an important role and has delivered landmark 
judgments to preserve the integrity of the union. 
For example, in the case of McCulloch v Maryland, two important constitutional law 
principles were introduced: firstly, the doctrine of implied powers to Congress for 
implementing the Constitution's express powers and secondly that a state's action 
may not hinder valid constitutional exercises of power.371 Whilst the constitution 
already provided for an elastic clause372 under Art I of the US Constitution,373 the 
Supreme Court in this case held that the word ‘necessary’ in the elastic clause does 
not refer to any one way of action, but applies to a wide range of other procedures 
for the implementation of all constitutionally expressed powers. In the words of CJ 
Marshall: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.374 
Judicial review is a powerful tool that a Supreme Court has to protect the 
constitution by determining whether the law passed or being passed is in 
accordance with the constitution. 
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In determining the constitutionality of the legislation, the court is not concerned 
with the wisdom, experience or policy of legislation. In the words of CJ Marshall: 
Whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the Constitution, is, at 
all times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, 
to be decided in the affirmative, in [a] doubtful case. … But it is not 
on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to 
be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be 
considered as void. The opposition between the Constitution and the 
law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction 
of their incompatibility with each other.375 
There have been different opinions regarding the Supreme Court's power of judicial 
review, for example, President Thomas Jefferson was of the view that the strategy 
of the founding fathers was to create three independent branches of government, 
but the power of review given to the Supreme Court, according to him, negated the 
doctrine of the separation of powers. Consequently, he argued that every separate 
branch should be their own judges of actions.376 Jefferson’s argument is, it is 
suggested, unsustainable as separation of powers goes side by side with checks and 
balances and without one the other is unachievable. 
In the context of this thesis, the concept of a powerful judiciary that can review the 
acts of the legislature and the executive is very important for the integrity of the 
country, at the same time, as indicated above, the US judiciary has also played an 
active role in maintaining and preserving the integrity of the union where the 
constitution was silent, for example, preventing secession attempts. 
One of the potential issues of disparity is secession movements, which, as described 
in Chapter 4, have happened in the past not once, but twice in Pakistan. It is 
therefore very important to analyse the secession paradigm under the US 
presidential model. Usually in parliamentary democracies, the political system does 
not necessarily strictly stop secession requests, for example, the referendum for 
Scottish independence in the UK referred to in Chapter 3.  
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The American Civil War involved secession of the southern states.377 In the early 
1860s, the southern states tried to secede, resulting in the bloodiest war ever fought 
on US soil. The war was a secession struggle of the southern states, over the issue 
of slavery.378 
Territorial referendums took place in Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, and Arkansas, 
each declaring victory for secession.379 Secession was resisted by the military and 
questions were brought before the Supreme Court in Texas v White.380 The Supreme 
Court held that the Confederate states were still states by extension, it held that all 
the seceding states were still states since the US Constitution did not allow for 
secession at all. 381 CJ Salmon Chase stated:  
The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible 
Union, composed of indestructible States. When, therefore, Texas 
became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble 
relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties 
of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. 
The act which consummated her admission into the Union was 
something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new 
member into the political body. And it was final. The union between 
Texas and other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as 
indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no 
place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, 
or through consent of the States.382 
The Supreme Court in this case had created a very strong and useful authority on 
demand for secession, establishing that secession is not an option under US 
constitutional law. The opinion of the Chief Justice in Texas v White has been 'widely 
accepted as being the final word on the issue of the legality of secession from the 
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perspective of American constitutional law'.383 The same principle was applied by 
the Supreme Court in the most recent Alaskan secession attempt in 2010.384 
It is argued that the reason the Supreme Court saved the union from disintegration 
was due to its constitutionally enshrined separation of powers, which created an 
independent and powerful judiciary. It was therefore less contentious to all parties 
when the decision was made in Texas v White and likewise the Alaskan case. In the 
next section, the role of the judiciary in Pakistan is explored and compared with the 
USA. 
5.3.2 Pakistan 
The power of the judiciary is not greatly different from that of the USA, its main role 
is to interpret the constitution and federal laws.385 As discussed earlier at 3.4, 
Virk386 and de Smith387 separately argued that Pakistan's federal judiciary played 
an important role in the country's political instability by interpreting the laws so as 
to favour usurpers of power such as military chiefs by ratifying their 
unconstitutional actions ex post facto. As discussed in Chapter, 4, the researcher’s 
finding is to the contrary, that in the majority of the cases,388 the judges did not in 
fact have scope to act otherwise than they did. First, they were bound by the 
parameters of the legislation they were required to interpret. Second, they were 
bound by precedent in the shape of the initial Tamizuddin case.   
Pakistan's federal court succeeded its British Indian predecessor, the Federal Court 
of India and subsequently established the Supreme Court in 1956. It has retained 
its name ever since.389 
Pakistan's constitution defines the composition, jurisdiction, powers and functions 
of the Court.390 Like the USA, Pakistan's Supreme Court also exercises original, 
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appellate and review jurisdiction.391 The constitution of Pakistan provides for the 
independence of the judiciary.392 Nevertheless, the constitution assigns the 
Supreme Court the responsibility of maintaining harmony and balance between the 
legislature, executive and judiciary.393 In theory, the Supreme Court is required to 
preserve, protect and defend the constitution.394 
As described in Chapter 4, Pakistan has undergone several episodes of martial law, 
where the constitutions were either abrogated or held in abeyance. These extra-
constitutional acts were challenged in the courts. The analysis of those cases in 4.3 
revealed patterns of how the courts approached those cases by invoking necessity 
and how they impacted significantly on the development of the political system in 
Pakistan so that the first occasion on which a parliamentary term was completed 
was in 2008.395 
As also described in Chapter 4, the implementation of the doctrine of necessity was 
innovated by Pakistan's judiciary and has played an important role as several 
dissolutions of governments have been associated with this doctrine.  
By contrast, the US Supreme Court did not need a legal justification to substantiate 
its action in its decision of Texas v White, because it was in its original jurisdiction 
rather than trying to justify a previous decision by an executive. It is argued, the 
US Supreme Court has never had to ratify an action taken by the executive or 
legislature in the name of necessity since it is completely independent of the other 
branches by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers.  
Due to the application of checks and balances in the US political system, people in 
power cannot necessarily take decisions motivated by their own self-interest and 
even if they take, they are highly unlikely to implement.  However, it is possible, for 
the president to make an executive order which can be brought to the Supreme 
Court to check its constitutionality. For example, most recently the constitutionality 
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of President Obama's Affordable Care in 2014 and President Trump's Muslim Travel 
Ban in 2017,396 were checked and reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
In the constitutional history of Pakistan as discussed in Chapter 4, people in power 
such as prime ministers, presidents and military chiefs have considered their self-
interests. Briefly, as described in 4.3.3, Bhutto in the initial 1973 Constitution 
assigned all powers to the Prime Minister (i.e. himself) leaving only a ceremonial role 
for the President. General Zia, through the 8th Amendment, shifted all the powers 
to the President (i.e. himself). Sharif had to repeal the 8th Amendment through the 
13th Amendment to revert all powers to the Prime Minister (i.e. himself) and General 
Musharraf, through the 18th amendment, restored the 8th amendment so shifting 
powers back to the president (i.e. himself).  
The Supreme Count technically cannot nullify these amendments since they are 
passed by the legislature following the defined constitutional procedure. There is no 
issue about who exercises the power: the president or the Prime Minister. The 
question of why the power keeps shifting from one office to another raises issues of 
self-interest. On this basis, it would have been appropriate for the Supreme Court 
to put an end to this practice by nullifying those amendments relating to power 
shifts. The Supreme Court's invariable silence on the matter has raised issues of 
impartiality and independence. 
Important factors promoting the integrity, impartiality and independence of the US 
Supreme Court judiciary is that they hold lifetime appointments and their 
nominations are approved by a popularly elected house. Whereas, in the case of 
Pakistan, judges are appointed by a bureaucratic promotion system and retire at 
the age of 65. It is argued that, in the case of Pakistan, without sureties of tenure, 
the judiciary lacks the security of position required for independent, bold, brave and 
impartial decisions. 
The functioning of the Supreme Court and the tenure of judges may not be directly 
related to the political system since these can be reformed by any political system, 
however, it is the separation (of powers) element that is paramount and is one of 
the key factors selected for the Democratic Federal Political System. 
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5.4 The key factors in the US context 
The functional comparative analysis seems to suggest adopting US solutions to the 
problems of Pakistan, for example, abolition of indirect election of upper house, 
direct election of head of government. So as not to idolise the US system just 
because it is functioning for that State and has been doing so for a long time, the 
rationale and objectivity is thus important to propose such a significant change to 
Pakistan's political system. It is important to apply the test in section 4.3 about the 
key factors to the US Political System before any further inference is drawn in the 
Chapter 6. The analysis of this test is not circular. It is accepted that the key factors 
were initially drawn from the US system, however, these key factors, as indicated 
in Chapter 1, are also recognised legal concepts, and, as explained in Chapter 3, 
rooted in philosophical concepts. This test will reveal whether these key factors are 
fully manifested in the US political system. 
As discussed in Section 5.2, the US Congress does provide for two dimensional 
representation, the lower house represents the people and the upper house 
represents the federating units and both of these houses are directly elected.  
The researcher however does not agree that the equal representation in reflected in 
the indirect election of the US president through electoral college. As explained in 
3.2, the presence of the Electoral College negates transparent representation. Since 
the legislature is directly elected in both houses, but the executive is not, the US 
political system only partly complies with the first key factor.  
The doctrine of separation of powers has become ingrained within the US political 
system, which is equipped with a significant system of checks and balances.397 
Although there is no explicit article in the US constitution that indicates the 
doctrine of separation of powers, nevertheless, the way the US political system is 
designed is a clear demonstration of the implementation of these doctrines. For 
example, constitutionally, the three branches of government under the US political 
system are independent of each other.398  
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The judicature likewise has its own freedom.399 It has the power of judicial review 
over the legislature and the executive and can also nullify legislation or executive 
acts if they are construed to be repugnant to the constitution.400 As such, the US 
judiciary acts as the custodian of the constitution. 
The third question of self-interest however has several debatable manifestations in 
the US political system in the form of presidential executive power, also recently 
referred to as unitary executive theory.401  
Self-interest was, for example, manifested in the spoils system: a patronage system 
in use until the 19th century.  This was a practice in which a party gave civil service 
posts to its party supporters, friends or family as opposed to a merit system.402 Due 
to such practices, there was a potential for ineffectiveness and corruption. The 
Pendleton Act was passed in 1887 to abolish such practices. Although the president 
of the US is invested with so much power that an issue of self-interest may arise in 
theory, nevertheless, the separation of powers and rule of checks and balances are 
implemented in such a fashion that his accountability is now much stricter to avoid 
compromises of constitutional integrity.  
The unitary executive theory appeared during the President George W Bush 
administration in 2001, where exercising broad executive powers was justified by 
the judiciary, for example his war on terror went far beyond what the founding 
fathers would have originally foreseen.403 President Obama also advanced his 
executive powers in the same way as his successor in both foreign and domestic 
policy.404 President Trump took his executive powers to a whole new level, one of a 
few examples of which is his controversial executive order on immigration.405  
These examples may appear to be suggesting that the checks and balances system 
as discussed in 3.2 is not as effective as it should be. Optimistically speaking, 
constitutionality of the order was challenged in the judiciary. If the order turned out 
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to be constitutional, it may mean that the legislature was trying to halt the 
presidential orders without justification or they were simply saving themselves from 
controversial issues such as immigration, education, health or war. 
On the other hand, it is possible that indeed the checks and balances system is only 
strong in theory and in practice, and that it is not as operational as stipulated by 
the doctrine.  
Presidential executive power and the issue of self-interest in Pakistan are not 
comparable. Historically, in the case of British India and then Pakistan, the issue 
of self-interest revolved around the executive head seeking to remain in power even 
if it involved extra-constitutional steps as described in Chapter 4. By comparison, 
in the case of the USA, as evident from the recent presidents' executive orders, the 
self-interest element is very slight and is confined to their agenda, either related to 
their manifesto or foreign policy, rather than their individual interest in staying in 
power.406 On that basis, a reasonable inference is that despite the risk of 
unrestrained executive powers, these powers do not come under the purview of the 
self-interest issue raised in the test. 
This chapter completes the comparative analysis and it is now apparent that both 
the countries do indeed have similarities in their state structures but have very 
different constitutional instruments to run them. It has been observed that the 
political system adopted by the USA is effectively working for it. On the other hand, 
all the political systems adopted and tested by Pakistan have proved to be either 
less effective or ineffective at all. Appendix 1 shows the entire constitutional 
comparison of both countries. 
The next chapter takes the findings from both parts of the comparative review and 
uses them to answer the research questions and respond to the starting 
hypothesis.   
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6. Conclusion 
According to the researcher's hypothesis of constitutional suitability, outlined in 
Chapter 1, Pakistan has had unsuitable political systems ever since its formation 
in 1947. The analysis in this thesis has been focused on the premature dissolution 
of government as a symptom of such instability. The hypothesis on which this thesis 
is based is that this, in turn, is a product of the poor design of the country's 
constitution.   
As established in Chapter 2, Pakistan is, in principle a democratic federal state, so 
a suitable political system for it would be a Democratic Federal Political System.  
This concept forms the basis of the underlying hypothesis of the thesis. 
The literature review in Chapter 3 explored the theoretical basis of a number of key 
factors of such a system so as to provide a conceptual framework by which to test 
that hypothesis. These factors included federalism (at 3.1), disparity of 
representation (at 3.2); separation of powers (at 3.3); state necessity (at 3.4) and 
statute structure (at 3.5).   
Chapter 4 then evaluated the extent to which Pakistan has or has had a Democratic 
Federal Political System properly comprising the key factors of equal 
representation), separation of powers and a system of checks and balances and an 
absence of the influence of self-interest on the part of those able to take over power 
or amend the constitution. This chapter also considered the effect of judicial 
encouragement in terms of interpretation and use of the doctrine of state necessity 
(discussed in 3.3 and 4.3).  
Using the methodologies described in Chapter 2, the hypothesis was then tested by 
reference to four subsidiary research questions, set out in Chapter 1. These are 
answered here as follows. 
1. Is political instability in terms of premature dissolution of government an on-
going and important issue in Pakistan?  
The analysis in Chapter 4 established the fundamental point that premature 
dissolution of government has been part of Pakistan's constitutional history since 
the formation of the country.  Furthermore, Chapter 4 demonstrated a pattern in 
which there is a causative relationship between assertion of state necessity, the 
premature dissolution of government and ratification by the courts.  
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2. Are the present and past political systems Democratic Federal ones? 
The answer to this question is in in the negative. In answering this question, the 
researcher investigated the presence of the key factors explained in Chapter 4 not 
only in the current situation but in each phase of constitutional development from 
1935 to date.  
2.1 Does the political system address issues of equal representation? 
It is concluded in Chapter 4 at 4.3 that Pakistan's past and present political systems 
do not, because the earlier political systems had a unicameral legislature and the 
present bicameral legislature does not provide for direct election of the upper house. 
Therefore, equal representation of provinces, i.e. the second dimension is not 
preserved. 
2.2 Does the political system provide for separation of powers and checks and 
balances? 
It is concluded in Chapter 4 at 4.3 that none of Pakistan's past or present political 
systems provided for separation of powers, mainly due to a parliamentary 
arrangement where the executive is associated with the legislature and the 
legislature, as concluded in the discussion in Chapter 4 of seat allocation – is 
inappropriately constituted. The lack of effective separation of powers and of a 
functioning system of checks and balances contributes to the problem of political 
instability in the form of disparity of representation and self-interest that raise 
claims of necessity and ultimately lead to premature dissolution. 
2.3 Are there elements of self-interest exercised by influential individuals that can 
override the controls in the system? 
It is concluded in Chapter 4 that there are such elements.  The first of these is 
Article 58 (2) (b) of the constitution that gives the president discretionary powers to 
dissolve the legislature, a provision that underwent a number of reforms. The 
presence, or not, of such a constitutional power has not, however, prevented 
premature dissolution through coup d’état and imposition of martial law.  
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The second factor is that, when heads of state have dissolved legislatures, the 
judiciary have almost always, as set out in 4.3, supported their actions in the name 
of necessity.407  
Consequently, none of the preceding political systems of Pakistan conformed with 
the key factors that it is argued are important for a democratic federal state. Nor 
has it ever adopted a suitable political system which incorporates these factors. 
3. Is there any connection between premature dissolution of government and one 
party having an absolute majority? 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the political system does not address 
questions of equality of representation. It was demonstrated that the problem of 
disparity causes reliance on the doctrine of state necessity, because it risks 
disintegration of the federation and such reliance causes the overthrow of 
government and premature dissolution of government. Chapter 4 therefore 
concludes that none of the political systems of Pakistan appropriately dealt with the 
issue of representation in the second dimension. A connection can also be inferred 
from the fact that, as noted in Chapter 4, on the first anomalous occasion in which 
the disparity was removed, and the coalition reinforced checks and balances, it 
resulted in Pakistan's first ever completion of a parliamentary term, which has, 
fortunately for the stability of the country, been repeated in the 2018 elections. 
4. Is the state structure of Pakistan compatible with a Democratic Federal Political 
System?  
Having established that the problems in Pakistan can be traced to faults in the 
constitutional arrangements, the fourth sub-question was answered in Chapter 5. 
Here it was concluded that Pakistan’s political structure is not suitable for its 
constitutional framework and it significantly fails the test of alignment with a 
Democratic Federal Political System. It is, as described above, the researcher’s 
hypothesis that a US presidential model might be better aligned. The researcher's 
choice of comparator in the structural and functional comparative analysis in 
Chapter 5 was the USA because of its similarity of state structure with Pakistan. To 
                                           
407 Except for the April 1993 act of president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, overturned by CJ Nasim Hassan 
Shah where the judiciary did not rely on necessity, because the constitution already provided for the 
power. 
102 
 
ensure that the comparison was rigorous, the key factors, in particular that of the 
operation of self-interest, were also applied to the US political system (at 5.4).   
The points of comparison in Chapter 5 were narrowed down to two main topics; 
state structures and government structure.  
In terms of state structure, Chapter 5 concluded that the USA and Pakistan share 
the same state structure in many respects such as their colonial history and 
multiple federating units that opted to form a union. In terms of government 
structure, Chapter 5 concluded that both the countries however adopted a very 
different form of political systems. The political system adopted by the USA is 
effective and suitable with its state structure, whereas Pakistan's present and past 
political systems have clashed with its state structure, which in turn has put the 
country in to a state of political instability. 
Can a Democratic Federal Political System resolve the problem of premature 
dissolution of government in Pakistan? 
The answers to the subsidiary research questions have, therefore, demonstrated 
that the answer to the overall research question for the thesis is that it is in the best 
interests of Pakistan to adopt a Democratic Federal Political System as defined in 
this thesis. It will counter, and may put an end to, the issue of necessity arising out 
of disparity of representation which, in turn, leads to premature dissolution of 
government. The political system Pakistan should adopt should, it is argued, be 
based on that of the USA with the following adjustments: 
• Preserving the religious provision to recognise a critical part of Pakistan’s 
cultural identity and so as to ease adoption of a new constitution. 
• Providing for popular election for the head of government/state. 
Under such a Democratic Federal Political System, if introduced in Pakistan, there 
would be no need for a constitutional mechanism to dissolve parliament before its 
expiry, at the same time, the issues of disparity would be resolved and thus prevent 
claims in the courts based on the doctrine of necessity from arising.  
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6.1 Researcher’s Contribution to Knowledge & Practice 
The contribution of this thesis is to both knowledge and practice.  This is because 
the findings highlight new knowledge but because that knowledge is, it is argued, 
also critical for the effective practice of constitutional lawyers, judges and others in 
Pakistan.  
6.1.1 Contribution to knowledge 
In terms of knowledge, this thesis has, through use of the key factors analysis, 
demonstrated that the political system in Pakistan, though envisaged and described 
as a democratic federal system, does not in fact function as one. This contributes 
to assertions of a state of necessity, endorsed by the judiciary, which result in 
premature dissolution of government and can be traced to the underlying disparity 
in representation between the provinces. In addressing the problems caused by the 
failures in democratic federalism, the thesis has considered the USA, rather than 
the UK, with which Pakistan has a historical, colonial connection.  Both are; 
however, former colonial states and this thesis has demonstrated that, with some 
adjustments and variations, a US-style presidential system could address the 
problems of Pakistan by emphasising separation of powers in a way that, in 
practice, has not been the case in Pakistan. 
The researcher is not proposing to adopt the US model in its entirety after 
discovering some flaws in that system,408 Pakistan can address those flaws before 
adopting that model. In any case, the system proposed is not entirely untested, the 
USA has been functioning using the same model for a very long time, of course there 
have been issues within the USA as well.409 Pakistan will therefore have an 
advantage in being able to identify and to remove any flaws that the US model may 
currently have. These variations also add to the contribution to knowledge provided 
by this thesis. 
6.1.2 Contribution to practice 
The researcher's contribution to practice in this thesis encompasses two things. 
First, a wider perspective in the practice of constitutional reform which challenges 
a pro-British mindset, the legacy of the British administration in legislation and 
                                           
408 These flaws mainly refer to the method of presidential election and the enormous presidential 
executive powers which can be misused by a primitive democracy such as Pakistan. 
409 Such as indirect election of Senate and the patronage system.  
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legal culture and animosity to the USA. Second, a response to established and 
conservative beliefs of key actors in legal practice (the intelligentsia, judges, lawyers) 
about the adequacy of the current system and the possibility of change.  Both can 
be the foundation for changes in law reform practice. 
A wider perspective in the practice of constitutional reform 
The wider perspective is represented by the use of the USA as a comparator. The 
researcher has observed a reluctance in the Pakistani intelligentsia, particularly in 
the right wing parties, towards adopting the ways of the USA. His findings provide 
an opportunity to challenge this animosity against the USA that is prevalent 
amongst politicians, members of the judiciary and constitutional lawyers.   
The researcher is fully aware of the place of Islam in Pakistan's culture, after all the 
country was created in the name of Islam, where the Muslims of India could live 
according to Islamic practices and customs. The constitutional instruments 
discussed in this thesis, therefore, throughout the history of Pakistan enshrined 
basic Islamic principles and elevated them to a position of untouchability.  
Principles of Islam, therefore, transcend, rather than impact on, the stability or 
otherwise of individual governments. 
Further discussion about the state religion is beyond the scope of this thesis since 
the place of religion is not effected. Nevertheless, none of the reforms proposed 
through this thesis clash with Islamic virtues. The researcher, therefore, suggests 
that constitutional reforms are possible, and that using a template taken from the 
USA does not prejudice Pakistani autonomy or religious culture.  This is because it 
is only a template, which can and should be adapted to Pakistani culture where 
Islam is given a superior place.   
A response to conservative beliefs of key actors that can be the foundation for changes 
in law reform practice 
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The conservatism is represented first by an allegiance to the British legal system as 
a post-colonial legacy Key local legal instruments i.e., Civil Law,410 Criminal Law411 
and Law of Evidence412 are those drafted and enacted by the British rulers.  
Second, there is an inherent reluctance to be open about the idea of adopting a 
presidential form of government. It is assumed that any presidential system must 
be that of General Khan (at 4.3.3).  There are fears about despotism. Here too the 
use of the USA as a comparator demonstrates that key factors of its system such 
as separation of powers and checks and balances in the context of political system 
are capable of addressing this concern. There are also fears of change, based on an 
assumption that since the current constitution was reached by consensus, any 
proposal for change would be strongly opposed.   
The researcher’s approach, however, demonstrates that such fears can be 
addressed.  The country does not have to abrogate or subvert the constitution 
entirely as a small number of constitutional amendments can address these issues.  
As an experiment, therefore, this thesis provides an example of the use of a wider 
and more creative perspective in constitutional reform, which can be adopted by 
lawyers or politicians as an enduring part of their practice as reformers.  This then 
links with the final recommendations for policy and future research, designed to 
further the contribution to practice represented by this thesis.  
6.2 Recommendations for policy and future research.  
In order to implement the recommendations made in this thesis, a detailed 
implementation study will be required to inform future policy.  This will involve 
feasibility but could also investigate public opinion about the proposed changes. 
Changing a political system requires substantial changes to the constitutional law, 
which can be a challenging task. It not only requires an absolute majority, but, in 
most cases, unanimity, otherwise it may not work. This unanimity will be facilitated 
by the changes in perspective amongst those involved in implementing change 
suggested as part of the contribution to practice. 
                                           
410 The Civil Procedure Codes 1908, as the year suggests, Pakistan was not even formed at the time. 
411 The Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the years suggest, 
Pakistan was not even formed at the time. 
412 Evidence Act 1872.  However this was amended in 1984 and renamed the Qanoon-e-Shahadat 
Order.  It is, however, almost the same document word for word. 
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A detailed implementation study will ensure that future policy is robust and 
evidence-based.  Factors that will need to be considered include: 
• Which body shall prepare and make recommendations for the new 
constitution, for example should this be the existing constituent assembly? 
What should be the membership of such a body?  
• Which body should commission and provide the terms of reference for the 
new constituent assembly, for example, should this be all political parties 
with the support of the military? 
• As a result of the reforms, who should be the chief executive and head of 
state, since, under a Democratic Federal Political System, both are one, then 
the question is which office shall be dissolved. 
• Whether Pakistan should assume a completely new constitution or introduce 
a substantial amendment to the existing one? 
• What will happen to the existing offices and elected members, will they serve 
out their time or be removed immediately? 
• Should there be transitional provisions and if so, what should those 
transitional provisions be? 
• What is the scope and likelihood of the risk that a ruling party would seek 
re-election after the new system has been implemented to legitimise their 
mandate? 
Although the implementation stage will require further research and feasibility 
studies on the points listed above, however, it may be appropriate for the 
implementation study to use a detailed proposal as a consultation benchmark.  The 
researcher proposes that this benchmark could be as follows. 
All parties (ruling and opposition) should agree with the military leadership to form 
a constituent assembly whose sole task shall be to give the country its new 
constitution under the Democratic Federal Political System. The timing of this is 
crucial and a good time to do this will be at the end of the government’s term when 
as a matter of usual practice, a caretaker government is formed for three months. 
An exception should be made to extend the tenure of the caretaker government to 
nine months so that the constituent assembly can finish its work under an impartial 
government. The caretaker government would then introduce the new constitution 
which would fully incorporate the Democratic Federal Political System. 
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A date should then be decided when all the elections – for the lower house, the 
upper house and the president - are announced at the same time to save 
unnecessary costs and time delay. Obviously subsequent elections cannot be 
synchronised since the terms will be different: for the lower house two years, for the 
upper house three years initially and then six years going forward and for the 
president four years. These dates will be set in a manner for the future so that none 
of these ever overlap. 
Other major changes will include the offices of Chief Ministers, the abolition of the 
role of the Prime Minister and the number of upper house members being confined 
to two per federating unit (so as to address the issue of disparity of representation).   
Further research into the implementation of the reforms discussed in this thesis 
will inevitably be required. Such a project will require an in-depth understanding of 
the function of different machineries within the government so as to be able to 
recommend transition and complete enactment of the new system. The researcher 
would like to be in a position to carry this out himself but recognises that others 
might be commissioned to do so. 
The researcher does not underestimate the challenge presented by his proposals.  
Nevertheless, it is his view, and his hope, that with the knowledge presented by this 
thesis, and the call to practitioners to take on wider and more creative approaches 
to law reform, a more stable, and fairer, Pakistan will be the result. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 3 - Salient Features of the USA and Pakistan 
 USA Pakistan 
Federating Units 50 states 4 provinces 
Population 326.6 Million 204.9 Million 
Origin Post-Colonial (British) Post-Colonial (British) 
State Structure Federation  Federation  
Political System Federal Non-Federal 
Head of State President President (Ceremonial) 
Election of Head of State Direct Indirect 
Government Structure 
Executive, Legislature 
and Judiciary 
Executive, Legislature 
and Judiciary 
Tenure of Head of Government 
4 years limited to 2 
terms 
5 years, unlimited 
terms 
Election of Head of government Direct N/A Majority leader 
Power Flow between government 
branches 
Separated 
Co-ordinated 
/interdependent 
Cabinet Affiliations Separate to Legislature Part of legislature 
Members of Lower house & 
Tenure 
435 (2 Years) 342 (5 Years) 
Election of members Popular Popular 
Majority required to form 
government 
N/A  172 
Maximum Seat allocation  California (53) Punjab (183) 
Members of Upper House & 
Tenure 
100 (6 Years) 104 (6 Years) 
Elections of Members Direct Indirect 
Judicial organ Supreme Court Supreme Court 
Tenure Lifetime Retirement at 65 
Secessions None 1 Bangladesh 1971 
Episodes of Martial Law None 3 
No of constitutional instruments 1 since 1787 
3 Constitutions since 
1947 
No of Amendments 27 since 1787 18 since 1973 
109 
 
Bibliography 
Adams M and Bomhoff J (ed), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2012). 
Adeney K, 'A Step Towards Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics of the 
18th Amendment' (2012) 42(4) Publius: The Journal of Federalism 539. 
Adler SM, 'Multiple Layers of a Researcher's Identity: uncovering Asian American 
Voices' in Kagendo Mutua & Beth Blue Swadener (ed), Decolonizing Research 
in Cross-Cultural Contexts: Critical Personal Narratives (State University of New 
York Press 2004). 
Agamben G, 'Chapter 1: The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government' in 
State of exception (Kevin Attell (tr), University of Chicago Press 2005). 
Akbar M, The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement (Xlibris 2011). 
Ali M, Politics of Federalism in Pakistan 1947 -1958 (Royal Book Company 1996). 
Ali Z, 'Property tycoon ‘invests’ in Senate elections' Dawn (2015). 
Althusius J, 'The Birth of Federal Theory: An Alternative Political Language in the 
Early Era of Centralized States' in Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman (ed), 
Theories of Federalism: A Reader (Palgrave 2005). 
Amar VD, 'Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the 
Seventeenth Amendment' (1996) 49(6) Vanderbilt Law Review xiv 
Anonymous, 'History of Admirability Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of the 
United States' (1871) 5(4) American Law Review 88 
Ansari SH, 'Forced Modernization and Public Policy: A Case Study of Ayub Khan 
Era (1958-69)' 18(1) Journal of Political Studies 45. 
Aslund A and others, 'How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist Countries' 
(1996) 1996(1) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 217. 
Azmat Z, 'JST demands Sindh’s independence from Punjab’s ‘occupation’' The 
News (Karachi, 19 March 2012) 
Balkin JB, 'Interdisciplinarity as Colonization' (1996) 53(3) Washington and Lee 
Law Review 949 
Banakar R, Merging Law and Sociology: Beyond the Dichotomies of Socio-Legal 
Research (Galda and Wilch 2003). 
Baxi P, Rai SM and Ali SS, 'Legacies of common law: ‘crimes of honour’ in India 
and Pakistan' (2006) 27(7) Third World Quarterly 1239. 
110 
 
Baxter C, 'Constitution Making: The Development of Federalism in Pakistan' 
(1974) 14(12) Asian Survey 1074. 
Baxter C, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, Robert C. Oberst, 'Government 
and Politics in South Asia' 74(4) Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia 
628 
Becker CL, 'Our Great Experiment in Democracy; a History of the United States' 
(Harper 1927). 
Bertram C, 'Jean Jacques Rousseau' (2012) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/rousseau/> 
accessed 05 December 2018 
Bhagwan V & Bhushan V, World Constitution - A Comparative Study (Sterling 
Publishers 1998). 
Bok H, 'Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat' (2014) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/montesquieu> 
accessed 05 December 2018 
Boone J, 'Pakistan's prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani disqualified by supreme 
court' The Guardian (19 June 2012). 
Boss SM, Working Constitution in India, A Commentary on Government of India Act 
1935 (OUP 1939). 
Brink D, 'Legal Interpretation and Morality' in B Leiter (ed), Objectivity in Law and 
Morals (Cambridge University Press 2001). 
Bristow W, 'Enlightenment' (2010) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/enlightenment/> 
accessed 05 December 2018 
Brookefield FM, 'The Fiji Revolutions of 1987' (1988) New Zealand Law Journal 
250. 
Burgess J, 'Civil War and the Constitution 1859 - 1865' (Scribners Sons 1909) 
Burke E. 'A letter from Mr. Burke, to a member of the National assembly; in 
answer to some objections to his book on French affairs (1791)'  
Burke R, Criminal Justice Theory: An Introduction (Routledge 2012). 
Butt T, 'Political foes on same page to curb horse-trading' Pakistan Telegraph 
(Islamabad, 28 February 2015). 
Chanda A, Federalism in India (George Allen & Unwin 1965). 
111 
 
Charleton J et al, 'Framers of the Constitution' (1986) Washington, National 
Archives and Records Administration  
Chaudhry U, 'Jurisprudence of a Fledgling Federation: A Critical Analysis of 
Pakistan’s Judicial View on Federalism' (Cornell Law School Inter-University 
Graduate Student Conference Papers, April 2011 2011)  
Chitty J, 'Chitty on contracts' in E. G. McKendrick (ed), Illustrations of the Doctrine 
(31st edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 2012). 
Christie GC, 'First Two Volumes of Holmes Devise History of the United States 
Supreme Court Are Published.' (1972) 58(5) American Bar Association Journal 
494 
Chynoweth P, 'Chapter Three: Legal research' in Andrew Knight (ed), Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Ist edn, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 
2008). 
Cohen ML, Berring R and Olson K, How to find the Law (9th edn, West Publishing 
Co 1989). 
Cohler AM, Miller BC, Stone HS (ed), Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (Anne M. 
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel Stone tr, Cambridge University 
Press 1989). 
Condo JA, 'The Veto of S. 3418: More Congressional Power in the President's 
Pocket' (1973) 22(2) Catholic University Law Review 394 
Creswell JW, Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five 
approaches (, 3rd edn, SAGE Publications 2013). 
Crilly R, 'Pakistan election guide: How does it work?' The Telegraph (2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10047665/Pa
kistan-election-guide-How-does-it-work.html> accessed 05 December 2018. 
Crotty M, The foundations of social research : meaning and perspective in the 
research process (SAGE 1998). 
Curran VG, 'Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative 
Law' (1998) 46(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 43 
Currie B, 'Scotland's future will be in Scotland's hands' Herald Scotland (25 May 
2012)  
Darby JJ, 'Congress and the Constitution' (1966) 526(6) Cornell Law Review 1027 
Dicey AV, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Roger E. 
Michener ed, 6th edn, Macmillan & Co 2005). 
Dunbar G, A History of India from the Earliest times to the Present Day, vol II 
(Nicelson & Waltson 1943). 
112 
 
Duncan S, 'Thomas Hobbes' (2013) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/hobbes> accessed 05 
December 2018  
Dwyer S and Buckle J, 'The Space Between: On Being an Insider-Outsider in 
Qualitative Research' (2009) 8(1) International Journal of Qualitative Methods 
54. 
Ebenstein W et al, American Democracy in World Perspective (Harper & Row 1970). 
Eberle E, 'The Method and Role of Comparative Law' (2009) 8(3) Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 451. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. 'Federal State' 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/203450/federal-state> 
accessed on 05 December 2018. 
Feldman SM, 'The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence' 
(1991) 76 Iowa Law Review 16 January 2016 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2566986> accessed 
05 December 2018. 
Ferguson RA, The American Enlightenment, 1750-1820 (Harvard University Press 
1994). 
Fisher W, Morton Horwitz and Thomas Reed, American Legal Realism (Oxford 
University Press 1993). 
Fishkin J and Pozen DE, 'Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball' (2018) 118(3) 
Columbia Law Review 915. 
Føllesdal A, 'Normative Political Theory and the European Union' in Knud Eric 
Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond (ed), Handbook of European 
Union Politics (SAGE 2007). 
Forsey EA. 'How Canadians Govern Themselves' 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/about/parliament/senatoreugeneforsey/book/chapte
r_2-e.html> accessed on 05 December 2018. 
Friedrich CJ, 'Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in 
Europe and America' (1941) World Constitutions Illustrated 30 January 2016 
Fulkerson R, 'Axiology' in Theresa Enos (ed), Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and 
Composition: Communication from Ancient Times to the Information Age 
(Routledge 1996). 
Fuller L, 'American Legal Realism' (1934) 82(5) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 429 
Gaddie RK, Wert JJ and Bullock CS, 'Seats, Votes, Citizens, and the One Person, 
One Vote Problem' (2012) 23(2) Stanford Law & Policy Review 433 
113 
 
Gardner S, 'Instrumentalism and Necessity' (1986) 6(3) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 431  
Garner JW, 'Government in the United States: National, State, and Local' (1911) 
World Constitutions Illustrated  
Government of Pakistan. 'Federal Government Structure' 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20130611235230/http://www.pakistan.gov.p
k/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5pbmZvcGFrLmdvdi5way9zdHJ1Y3R1c
mVfZ292ZXJubWVudC5hc3B4 > accessed on 05 December 2018. 
Greenberg M, 'How Facts Make Law' (2004) 10 Legal Theory 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=797125> accessed 05 
December 2018 
Grotius H, 'of things which belong to men in common' in Stephen Neff (ed), on the 
Law of War and Peace (Ist edn, Cambridge University Press 2012). 
Guitteau WB, 'Government and Politics in the United States: Problems in 
American Democracy.' (1918) World Constitutions Illustrated  
Harry TR, The Gathering of the Clan: An Independent Political Option for America 
(iUniverse 2009). 
Hart HLA, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71(4) Harvard 
Law Review 593. 
Hart HLA, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961). 
Hart SL, 'Axiology--Theory of Values' (1971) 32(1) Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 29  
Hermens FA, 'Representative Republic' (1958) World Constitutions Illustrated 
Hilsman R, To Govern America (Harry & Row 1979). 
Hobbes T, Leviathan, with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 (Edwin 
Curley ed, Hackett 1994). 
Hoecke MV, 'Legal Doctrine: Which method(s) for What kind of Discipline?' in 
Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research Which Kind of Method 
for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011). 
Hoecke MV, 'Methodology of Comparative Legal Research' (2015) Law and Method 
1  
Hume D, Essays : Moral, Political, and Literary (Eugene F Miller ed, 2nd edn, 
Liberty Fund Inc. 1985)  
Hussain F and Khan A, 'Role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional and 
Political Development of Pakistan: History and Prospects: Comparative Study 
114 
 
of Begum Nusrat Bhutto (1977) and Syed Zafar Ali Shah Case (2000)' (2012) 
5(2) Journal of Politics and Law 82. 
Hussain FA and Khan AB, 'Role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional and 
Political Development of Pakistan: History and Prospects' (2012) 5(2) Journal 
of Politics and Law 82 
Hutchinson T and Duncan N, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal 
Legal Research ' (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83. 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute. 'Eighteenth Amendment Revisited' (2012) 
<http://www.ipripak.org/eighteenth-amendment-revisited/> accessed on 05 
December 2018. 
Jones K. 'Instability continues in Pakistan following formation of coalition 
government' (2008) <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/03/paki-
m12.html> accessed on 05 December 2018. 
Kant I, 'An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?'' in H. S. Reiss (ed), 
Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge University Press 1970). 
Keith AB, A Constitutional History of India 1600 - 1935 (Halcyon Press 1961). 
Kelsen H, 'Law and Nature' in Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight (tr), 2nd edn, The 
Law Book Exchange Ltd 2005). 
Kerstetter K, 'Insider, outsider, or somewhere in between: the impact of 
researchers’ identities on the community-based research process' (2012) 27(2) 
Journal of Rural Social Sciences 99. 
Khalid I, 'Politics of Federalism in Pakistan: Problems and Prospects' (2013) 28(1) 
A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 199. 
Khan H, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2009). 
Khan IA, 'Senators admit votes sold in Senate polls' Dawn (2015). 
Khan M, 'Pakistan protests: Nawaz Sharif cornered' BBC News (2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29018054> accessed 05 December 
2018. 
Labunski R, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2006). 
Landon JS, 'Constitutional History and Government of the United States' (1900) 
World Constitutions Illustrated 316. 
Laski H, The American Presidency: An Interpretation (New Brunswick 1980). 
Legrand P, 'How to Compare Now' (1996) 16(2) Legal Studies 232 
115 
 
Lepaulle P, 'The Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological 
Jurisprudence' (1922) 35(7) Harvard Law Review 339 
Let's Start Thinking. 'Timeline of Military Rule in Pakistan' (2007) 
<http://www.letsstartthinking.org/history/timeline-of-military-rule-in-
pakistan.php> accessed on 05 December 2018 
Livingston WS, 'A Note on the Nature of Federalism' (1952) 67(1) Political Science 
Quarterly 81  
Locke J, Second Treatise of Government (Peter Laslett ed, 2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 1967). 
Lynch JM, 'Fletcher v. Peck: The Nature of the Contract Clause' (1982) 13(1) Seton 
Hall Law Review 1 
Lyon H, The Constitution and the Men Who Made It: The Story of the Constitutional 
Convention (The Riverside Press 1936). 
Manent P, 'Modern democracy as a system of separations' (2003) 14(1) Journal of 
Democracy 114. 
McBain HL, 'De Witt Clinton and the Origin of the Spoils System in New York' 
(1907) World Constitutions Illustrated 58. 
Merton R, 'Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge' 
(1972) 78 American Journal of Sociology 9. 
Michaels M, 'Comparative Law' in Oxford Handbook of European Private Law 
(Basedow, Hopt, Zimmermann eds., Oxford University Press forthcoming 
2011) <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2388> accessed 
05 December 2018. 
Michaels R, 'The Functional Method of Comparative Law' (2006) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law 339. 
Miller AS and Knapp GM, 'The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional 
Framework' (1977)(2) Indiana Law Journal 378 
Miller J, 'Hugo Grotius' (2014) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/grotius> accessed 05 
December 2018  
Mohs LT, 'Alaska's Initiative Process: The Benefits of Advance Oversight and a 
Recommendation for Change' (2014) 31(2) Alaska Law Review 301 
Morley F, 'Freedom and Federalism' (1959) World Constitutions Illustrated 119. 
Morris RB, 'We the People of the United States: The Bicentennial of a People's 
Revolution' (1977) 82 American Historical Review 1. 
116 
 
Myerson R, Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on 
the Government of Pakistan' (2014) 53 46 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.005> accessed 05 December 
2018 
Nanda VP, 'Self-Determination in International Law--The Tragic Tale of Two Cities-
-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)' (1972) 66(2) American 
Journal of International Law 321 
National Assembly of Pakistan. 'Parliamentary History' (2014) 
<http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=75> accessed on 05 December 
2018 
Navarro A, The Cristal Experiment: A Chicano Struggle for Community Control 
(University of Wisconsin Press 1998). 
Nelson WE, 'Constitutional History' 1966 Annual Survey of American Law 687. 
Newman KJ, 'Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes' (1959) 32(1) Pacific 
Affairs 18. 
Orucu E, 'Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law' (2006) 8(1) European 
Journal of Law Reform 29. 
Palermo FKK, Comparative Federalism: Constitutional Arrangements and Case Law 
(1st edn, Hart Publishing 2017). 
Palmer VV, 'From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law 
Methodology' (2005) 53(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 261. 
Pound R, 'What May We Expect from Comparative Law' (1936) American Bar 
Association Journal 56. 
Qazi S. 'Necessity as the mother of laws' (12 July 2012) 
<https://herald.dawn.com/news/1152911> accessed on 05 December 2018. 
Radan P, 'An Indestructible Union... of Indestructible States: The Supreme Court 
of the United States and Secession' (2006) 10 Legal History 187  
Raz J, Practical Reason and Norms (Hutchinson 1975). 
Reitz J, 'How to Do Comparative Law' (1998) 46(4) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 617. 
Riker W, 'Federalism' in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds), Handbook of 
Political Science (Addison-Wesley 1975). 
Riles A, 'Casting Off, and Reclaiming, the Weberian Tradition: Comparative Law 
and Socio-legal Studies' (2005) Legal Studies Research Paper Series 1 
Román E, Citizenship and Its Exclusions: A Classical, Constitutional, and Critical 
Race Critique (New York University Press 2010). 
117 
 
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1986). 
Rosenthal AJ, 'Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections' (1968) 67(1) 
The Michigan Law Review 1 
Rousseau JJ, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe (C.E. Vaughan tr, 
Constable 1917). 
Rudduck J and Hopkins D, Research as a Basis for Teaching: Readings from the 
Work of Lawrence Stenhouse (Heinemann 1985). 
Russell B, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1971). 
Ryan E, 'Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing 
Regional Conflict in a Pluralist Society' (2016) FSU College of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No 806 
Sacco R, 'Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment 
II of II)' (1991) 39(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 343. 
Saeed A, 'New provinces demands set to haunt N govt' The Nation (2013)  
Salamat Z, Pakistan 1947 - 1958, An Historical Review (Islamabad Institute of 
Historical & Cultural Research Institute 1992). 
Schmitt C, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (G 
Schwab tr, University of Chicago Press 2005). 
Schmitthoff M, 'The Science of Comparative Law' (1939) 7(1) The Cambridge Law 
Journal 94 
Selznick P, The Moral Commonwealth. Social Theory and the Promise of Community 
(University of California Press 1992). 
Sen A, The idea of justice (Belknap 2009). 
Serrant-Green L, 'Black on Black: Methodological Issues for Black Researchers 
Working in Minority Ethnic Communities' (2002) 9 Nurse Researcher 30. 
Shah A, Khan MI, Mahsood M. 'SUPERIOR JUDGES’ COMMITMENT TO JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN  PAKISTAN' (2011) 
<http://www.gu.edu.pk/New/GUJR/PDF/PDF-December-2011/7-
DONE%20Amanullah%20JUDICIAL%20COMMITMENT%20TO%20INDEPEND
ENCE.pdf> accessed 05 December 2018 
Sharma SR, Panchayati Raj and Education, vol II (Mittal Publications 1994). 
Siddiqi F, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir 
Ethnic Movements (Routledge 2012). 
Siddique A, 'Vote-Buying Allegations Cloud Pakistan Senate Elections' (2015) 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 
118 
 
Sikes P and Potts A (ed), Researching Education from the Inside: Investigations from 
Within (Routledge 2008). 
Simmel G and Kurt W, The Sociology of Georg Simmel  (The Free Press 1950). 
Singer JW, 'Legal Realism Now' (1988) 76(2) California Law Review 465  
Smith DSA, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Penguin 1986). 
Smith DSA, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Lord Woolf and Jeffrey Jowell 
ed, 5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995). 
Smith SS, Roberts JM, Wielen RJV, The American Congress (4th edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2006). 
Stavropoulos N, 'Obligations and the Legal Point of View' in A Marmor (ed), The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012). 
Stavsky MM, 'The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan' (1983) 16(2) Cornell 
International Law Journal 27 February 2016 
<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol16/iss2> accessed 05 December 
2018 
Stein M, 'Your place or mine: the geography of social science' in Dick Hobbs & 
Richard Wright (ed), The Sage Handbook of Fieldwork (Sage 2006). 
Sutherland L, The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics (The 
Clarendon Press 1952). 
Tasneem S, 'Montesquieu's Doctrine of Separation of Powers: A Case Study of 
Pakistan' (2012) 28(2) Journal of European Studies 27 February 2016 
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/1317166049?accountid=14693> 
accessed 05 December 2018 
Teitel R, 'Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age' (2004) 117(8) Harvard 
Law Review 2570. 
The Charters of Freedom. 'America's Founding Fathers' 
<http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_n
ew_jersey.html> accessed 05 December 2018 
The Claremont Institute. 'The Constitution and the Idea of Compromise' (2002) 
<http://www.pbs.org/georgewashington/classroom/index2.html> accessed 
05 December 2018. 
The Federalist Papers (2017) 
<https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Paper
s#TheFederalistPapers-78> accessed 05 December 2018. 
The Library of Congress. 'James Madison and the Federal Constitutional 
Convention of 1787' 
119 
 
<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/madison_papers/mjmconst.htm
l> accessed 05 December 2018 
Thomas CM, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation (Callaghan and Company 1876). 
Thomas GC, 'Solving India's Diversity Dilemma - Culture, Constitution, & Nehru' 
(2005) 6(2) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 21  
Thorpe FN, 'History of the American People' (1901) World Constitutions Illustrated 
Tribe LH, 'Introduction: History and Development of the Court in National 
Society--The United States Supreme Court' (1980) 3 Canada-United States 
Law Journal 56 
Tuckness A, 'Locke's Political Philosophy' (2012) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy  
United States Census Bureau. 'U.S. and World Population Clock' 
<https://www.census.gov/popclock/> accessed 05 December 2018. 
United States Senate. 'Connecticut Compromise' 
<http://www.Senate.gov/artandhistory/art/common/generic/Connecticut_C
ompromise_Unveiling.htm> accessed 05 December 2018. 
US Department of State. 'Office of the Historian' (2015) 
<https://history.state.gov/> accessed 05 December 2018. 
USA.GOV. 'U.S. Federal Government' (2015) 
<http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml#Legislative_Branch> accessed 
05 December 2018. 
Vallier I (ed), Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on Trends and 
Applications (University of California Press 1971). 
Vick D, 'Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law' (2004) 31 Journal of Law 
and Society 163. 
Vinx L, 'Carl Schmitt' (2014) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/schmitt> accessed 05 
December 2018 
Virk M, 'Doctrine of Necessity-Application in Pakistan- Cases of Immense 
Importance- A Critical Review' (2012) International J. Soc. Sci. & Education 
2(2) 02 March 2014 
Volden C, 'Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of William H. Riker' 
(2004) 34(4) Conservative Perspectives on American Federalism) Publius 89. 
Weinbaum MG, 'Civic Culture and Democracy in Pakistan' (1996) 36(7) Asian 
Survey 639. 
Wheare KC, Federal Government (OUP 1953). 
120 
 
Whitehead J and McNiff J, Action research living theory (SAGE Publications 2006). 
Wilson JQ et al, 'The American System' in American Government: Institutions and 
Policies (Wadsworth 2013). 
Wolf-Phillips L, 'Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity' 
(1979) 1(4) Third World Quarterly 98. 
World Facts and Figures. 'Pakistan' Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. 
'The Federalist Papers: No. 31'  
Yoo J, 'President Obama and the Framers' Presidency' (2013) 36(1) Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy 73. 
Zurcher AJ, 'Constitutions and Constitutional Trends since World War II; An 
Examination of Significant Aspects of Postwar Public Law with Particular 
Reference to the New Constitutions of Western Europe' (1955) World 
Constitutions Illustrated 94. 
 
 
